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Measuring and Managing Catastrophe Risk 
Ronald T. Kozlowski* and Stuart B. Mathewson t 
Abstract* 
We introduce some of the basic principles behind property catastrophe 
modeling via simulations. The output of such simulations can be explored 
via modernized pin maps and loss likelihood curves. We also briefly discuss 
some of the uses of catastrophe modeling in addition to traditional probable 
maximum loss estimation. Comments are made on the use of modeling by rein-
surers. We hope that this article stimulates discussions on new approaches to 
catastrophe modeling. 
Key words and phrases: exposure, simulation, reinsurance, pin maps, concen-
tration, market share 
* Ronald T. Kozlowski, F.C.A.S., M.A.A.A. is a consulting actuary in the Atlanta office 
of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. He holds a B.S. in actuarial science from the University 
of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. Mr. Kozlowski helped design TOPCAT, Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin's property catastrophe model and has spoken about the basics of catas-
trophe modeling. Mr. Kozlowski is also a member of the American Academy of Actu-
aries Subcommittee on Catastrophe Issues. 
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1 Introduction 
Property insurance companies have always been concerned with the 
risk of catastrophic loss. They have used mapping as a method to con-
trol their exposure since the 1800s when insurance companies were hit 
by fires in major cities (Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia). Mapping 
first was used to measure conflagration exposure; at that time there 
was no coverage for perils other than fire and lightning. Underwriters 
would place pins on a map showing the location of their insured build-
ings, and they would restrict the exposure the company would retain 
in a block or town. When wind storm was introduced as a covered 
peril in the 1930s, companies used mapping to assure that they were 
not overly concentrated for hurricane or tornado perils. 
Pin maps were used until the 1960s when companies abandoned this 
time-consuming practice. About this time the U.S. was experiencing a 
period of low frequency and severity of natural catastrophic events. 
Damaging hurricanes were scarce, especially in Florida, and a major 
earthquake had not occurred since 1906. Modern fire fighting and con-
struction practices had made the threat of conflagration minimal. As 
a result, the insurance industry largely lost the diSCipline of measuring 
and managing exposures susceptible to catastrophic loss. 
The property catastrophe reinsurance industry had done well in 
these fortunate times and subsequently reduced reinsurance rates to 
levels below long-term needs. Primary companies were able to purchase 
property catastrophe reinsurance at low prices. Property catastrophe 
reinsurance purchasing decisions were centered mainly around the de-
sired maximum limit; price considerations were not a significant con-
cern. Many primary companies managed their catastrophe exposures 
by purchasing reinsurance using crude rules of thumb and ignored their 
concentration of exposure. 
Other companies, because of either expense savings or the lack of 
capacity in the reinsurance market for large companies, decided to go 
without reinsurance. Without reinsurance costs these companies were 
able to write business at lower prices and thereby increase their market 
share, further exposing themselves to large reductions in their surplus 
from catastrophic losses. 
In 1989 this naive world changed. Hurricane Hugo swept through 
the Caribbean and hit the Atlantic coast of the United States, causing the 
largest catastrophe loss in history. The 1989 Lorna Prieta earthquake in 
San Francisco reawakened fears of earthquake losses. The reinsurance 
market began to react to these and other international events. Catastro-
phe reinsurance prices started to increase, and coverage was restricted. 
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Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida in 1992 on the heels of those 
events. Some insurance companies took significant hits to their sur-
plus; others went bankrupt. Many insurance companies had not real-
ized the extent of their exposure concentrations. Reinsurance markets 
reacted swiftly by sharply raising prices and retentions while restrict-
ing limits. Regulators, rating agencies, and boards of directors became 
intensely concerned about their companies' abilities to manage their 
catastrophe exposures. 
The Northridge, California earthquake and the Great Hanshin earth-
quake in Kobe, Japan have raised new concerns over the insurability 
of a major catastrophe and the success of engineering against earth-
quakes. Inadequate insurance pricing in catastrophe-prone areas has 
contributed to population growth and construction in some of the most 
catastrophe-prone areas in the United States. 
We will now discuss some of the basics of catastrophe modeling, the 
current capabilities, and some current modeling problems, starting with 
the most important component of catastrophe modeling: exposure. 
2 Exposure Data 
All discussions of catastrophic exposure management must begin 
with the accuracy and availability of exposure data. The most sophis-
ticated, complex catastrophe modeling systems cannot accurately esti-
mate an insurer's losses if the insurer cannot identify what insurance 
coverages have been written and where those risks are physically lo-
cated. 
Company exposure databases vary considerably. The decisions to 
retain exposure information may be based on statistical agency, rate 
filing, or management information requirements. Budget constraints 
also have contributed to the design of some exposure databases. Catas-
trophe exposure management considerations are almost always of sec-
ondary importance. 
Statistical plans for property coverages historically have been de-
signed around fire insurance rating. Any shifts toward retaining infor-
mation necessary for wind and earthquake insurance rating will not oc-
cur quickly, as changes to statistical plans have occurred infrequently. 
Exposure information can be separated into two categories: physical 
characteristics and insurance coverage. 
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2.1 Physical Characteristics 
Physical characteristics may include: 
• Type of risk; 
• Location; 
• Construction; 
• Number of stories; 
• Age of risk; 
• Number of risks. 
The type of risk characteristic can be described in insurance terms 
through the line of busines~, classification, and type of policy codes. 
The line of business codes can distinguish personal property, com-
mercial property, personal automobile, commercial automobile, per-
sonal inland marine, commercial inland marine, businessowner, or far-
mowner policies. Classification codes can distinguish the type of risks 
such as signs, boats, livestock, inventories, etc. The type of policy code 
can distinguish different types of commercial policies (mercantile, con-
tracting, motel, office, apartment, etc.). 
The quality of available location data varies substantially by com-
pany. The location recorded often is the billing location rather than the 
location of the property insured. While this may be only a moderate 
problem for personal lines, it can cause major distortions when mod-
eling commercial lines. For more complex commercial policies many 
of the locations are not identified. This type of coding may produce a 
false measure of concentrations at the billing location, while understat-
ing other areas. 
Some companies cannot provide location detail at zip code or street 
address. Location on a county or state detail can be spread to finer 
detail using population densities, census data, or credit reports, but 
this approach can lead to severe distortions in measuring the concen-
trations for a speCific insurance company. The National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is taking steps to force companies to 
collect zip code location information. The introduction of nine digit 
zip codes further will help to refine exposure location information. In 
the future exposure location identification could be determined within 
a few feet using satellite technology (global positioning systems). 
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2.2 Insurance Coverage 
Insurance coverage data may include: 
• Coverage type; 
• Coverage amounts; 
• Replacement cost provisions; 
• Insurance-to-value provisions; 
• Deductibles; 
• Co-insurance; 
• Reinsurance. 
Coverage type distinguishes the type of insured exposure such as build-
ings, contents, appurtenant structures, vehicles, business interruption, 
etc. Replacement cost and insurance-to-value provisions identify those 
provisions where the insurance coverage may be greater than the speci-
fied coverage amount. Deductibles, co-insurance, and reinsurance pro-
visions can reduce the insured loss to the company. 
Insurance coverage datq may vary by peril. For example, commercial 
earthquake policies may have sub limits. The hurricane peril may be 
excluded in some coastal counties due to wind coverage via windstorm 
pools. Companies also often impose higher deductibles for wind and 
earthquake perils. 
2.3 Data Problems 
Experience has shown that some insurance companies, particularly 
small to medium sized companies, have difficulty retrieving their data 
in a usable fashion. Extracted information may not balance with insur-
ance company reports. Exposure data may be unreliable due to input 
errors or heavy reliance on defaults. 
The first step to accurately measuring a company's exposures is to 
review the data collection and retrieval process to assure that the data 
give an accurate picture of insured properties. If the insurance com-
pany systems' personnel do not understand underwriting or insurance, 
they may not be able to verify the reasonableness of the data provided. 
Underwriting and/or actuarial personnel should be involved to assure 
the reasonableness of exposure data. Simple data checks on whether 
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the zip code is within the specified county or state or whether the im-
plied premium-to-exposure ratios appear reasonable can identify prob-
lems with the exposure data. 
Once exposure data are deemed to be reasonable, the modeling pro-
cess can begin. If accurate exposure data are not available, a market 
share approach could be used. The market share approach models in-
dustry exposures and distributes the losses to company via their market 
share. Market share analysis can misrepresent an individual company's 
losses significantly. 
Companies willing to invest in sophisticated databases to track their 
exposures and rate them using appropriate classification systems will 
have a competitive edge in coming years. 
3 Catastrophe Simulation Modeling 
Advances in computer technology have resulted in new quantitative 
tools developed to specifically manage catastrophic risk. Geographic 
information systems have allowed companies to resurrect pin maps 
with significant additional abilities. But beyond looking merely at ex-
posures, catastrophe simulation models have given us the ability to es-
timate potential losses in a way that reflects current scientific thinking 
on frequency and severity distributions. 
As actuaries we know that expected catastrophic losses and reinsur-
ance decisions should not be based entirely on past catastrophic losses. 
Insured loss data from catastrophes have been recorded for roughly the 
last 45 years. During this period, severe hurricanes and earthquakes 
were so infrequent that this body of experience is not representative 
of the scope of potential occurrences. Also, the distribution of insured 
properties has changed dramatically over time due to the population 
shift toward the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and the earthquake-prone ar-
eas of California. 
Clark (1986) and Friedman (1984) provide alternative methods for 
determining catastrophe losses through simulation modeling. Their 
methods involve first simulating the physical characteristics of a spe-
cific catastrophe, then determining damage to exposures, and then cal-
culating potential insured losses from damages. 
Although specific catastrophe simulation models are different, they 
all operate within a simple framework. The simulation models are 
based on three modules: (i) the science module, (ii) the engineering 
module, and (iii) the insurance coverage module. The specific func-
tional form of the equations provided for these modules is not impor-
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tant. The important elements are the types of variables the equations 
require. These modules are discussed below. 
3.1 The Science Module 
The science module simulates natural events such as hurricanes, 
storm surge, earthquakes, fire following earthquake, tornadoes, hail, 
winter storms, etc. The resulting force that causes damage by these 
events usually can be described through a series of equations. 
For hurricanes, numerous models exist to estimate wind speeds at 
risk locations caused by specific storms. A simplistic function of hur-
ricane wind speed at a location is shm,\'ll below. 
Wz = iw(dp, r, 5, l, a, t) (1) 
where: 
Wz Wind speed at location z; 
dp Ambient pressure minus central pressure; 
r Radius of maximum winds; 
5 Forward speed of the storm; 
Landfall location (longitude, latitude); 
a Angle of incidence at landfall; and 
t Terrain or roughness coefficient at location z. 
Clark (1986) describes one such modeling system and shows how hur-
ricanes can be simulated and used to estimate insurance losses. 
For earthquakes, the result of this module is a shaking intensity 
at a speCific location (Le., zip code or street address). One possible 
relationship is: 
lz = iI(m,5,e,a,g,d) (2) 
where: 
lz Shaking intensity at location z; 
m Magnitude of the earthquake; 
5 Fault or seismic area, including location and characteristics; 
e = Epicenter location; 
a Angle of the fault rupture; 
9 Ground conditions, including poor soil and liquefaction 
potential; and 
d Distance from fault rupture or epicentral area. 
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The specific forms of equations (1) and (2) are based upon meteo-
rological and geological hypotheses and are beyond the scope of this 
paper as these equations can range from simple equations to more com-
plicated series of differential equations. It is important, however, to 
note that the variables used by equations (1) and (2) are meteorological 
and geological in nature. 
3.2 The Engineering Module 
The engineering module is used to determine exposure damage re-
sulting from wind speeds or shaking intensities. Wind and earthquake 
engineering research and historical loss information determine these 
relationships. We can express these functions as follows: 
where: 
p(h) 
z 
pte) 
z 
j (h)( ) p Wz,c,a,s,v, 
f~e)(Iz, c, a, s, v), 
for hurricane 
for earthquake 
p~h) Percent damage from a hurricane at location z; 
p~e) Percent damage from an earthquake at location z; 
C Construction of building; 
a Age of building; 
S Number of stories; and 
v Coverage (Le., building, contents, time element). 
(3) 
(4) 
The variables used by equations (3) and (4) are engineering in nature. 
If we apply these damage percentages to the exposed properties 
from an insurance company's database, the result will be an estimate 
of the total damage to those properties caused by the simulated catas-
trophe. 
(5) 
where Dz is the damage at location z and Ez is the dollar exposure at 
location z. 
Underlying each damage curve or damage function is a frequency 
component and a severity component. The frequency component de-
termines the probability that a property will be damaged. The property 
is either damaged or not damaged. The severity component determines 
the percentage of the property that is damaged, given that damage has 
occurred. 
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Damages can vary by more than just construction type, number of 
stories, age of building, and type of coverage (e.g., regional construc-
tion practices, building code and bUilding code enforcement, occupancy 
use, surrounding terrain). Friedman (1984) gives an example of damage 
relationships that form the basis of the earlier wind models. A study 
conducted by the Applied Technology Council (1985) provides much of 
the basis for earthquake damage relationships. More research is being 
done by the engineering community to refine these relationships. A 
cooperative action by insurance companies to share detailed historical 
loss data with the engineering community could validate the theoretical 
research now being done. 
Recent studies have shown that additional exposure information 
such as window and door protection, roof covering, and roof sheathing 
attachment have the greatest influence on the overall resistance to hur-
ricane damage (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
1993). New studies such as these are helping insurance companies 
identify those underwriting factors that promote loss mitigation. Just 
as fire peril concerns determined early statistical reporting, the "'Tind 
and earthquake perils now may encourage finer detailed exposure in-
formation for underwriting control and exposure quantification. With 
the reporting of such important building characteristics, catastrophe 
models will improve their abilities to replicate historical1storm losses. 
3.3 The Insurance Coverage Module 
The insurance coverage module translates the damaged exposure 
into insured damaged exposure. Data required by this module include 
limits, replacement cost provisions, and insurance-to-value provisions. 
This module also includes loss reduction provisions such as deductibles, 
co-insurance, and reinsurance. 
The following example describes some of the considerations used 
when modeling a primary company's exposures. Different formulae 
may be used depending upon whether individual or aggregated expo-
sure data are used or if the modeled company is a primary company or 
a reinsurance company. 
(ID)z iID(Dz,r,d,l) 
min[max[(r x D z ) - d, 0], l] + a x Dz (6) 
where: 
(ID)z Insured damage at location z; 
220 
Dz 
r 
d 
a 
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Damage at location z; 
Guaranteed replacement cost multiplier; 
Deductible; 
Reinsurance limit; and 
Allocated loss adjusted expense (ALAE) percentage. 
The guaranteed replacement cost multiplier adjusts damage to reflect 
the cost of replacing an item. Policy conditions determine whether the 
insurance limit will have an impact on the replacement cost coverage. 
Deductibles need to be modeled as a straight dollar deductible or 
percentage deductible. Models must consider the impact of the de-
ductible upon the losses. If the model works on a per risk basis and 
simulates the varying severity levels of damage, the impact of the de-
ductible can be determined easily. If the model uses aggregate expo-
sure data, however, it must reflect that not all risks will suffer dam-
age greater than their deductibles. As wind speed or shaking intensity 
increases, the average severity damage increases and more of the de-
ductible is utilized. 
Reinsurance adjustments should reflect both pro rata and per risk 
excess policies written on both a facultative and treaty basis. Reinsur-
ance such as catastrophe reinsurance or other aggregate reinsurance 
can be incorporated after damage for an event is aggregated for all 
risks. Deductibles and reinsurance coverage may vary on a per build-
ing or per occurrence basis. 
Unlike the science and engineering modules, the insurance module 
is based upon actuarial principles. Careful consideration of the impacts 
of deductibles, reinsurance, replacement cost provisions, and other in-
surance coverages must be made. The impact of these insurance cov-
erages is discussed by other authors and will not be reproduced here. 
(See, for example, Head (1971) and Lee (1988).) This insurance module 
should include a reflection of allocated loss adjustment costs and loss 
of use or business interruption coverage. 
3.4 Deterministic VS. Probabilistic Modeling 
Models can be based on deterministic or probabilistic approaches. 
Deterministic modeling is the simulation of specific events, either his-
torical or hypothetical, that are pertinent to the portfolio under study. 
This approach can be helpful for validating model results or for pro-
viding a estimate for an certain event that concerns management. 
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Probabilistic modeling, however, has the potential to provide much 
more information to management. It can provide information for pri-
mary or reinsurance pricing and for setting underwriting or marketing 
strategies. In probabilistic modeling the modeler runs a large set of 
hypothetical events (scenarios) that covers a range of potential events. 
The results from these simulations can be used to estimate the prob-
abilities of various levels of loss to the company (Le., loss likelihood). 
This approach allows the company to manage its exposure portfolio and 
make reinsurance decisions by comparing the potential losses with the 
company's appetite for risk. 
4 Techniques to Locate and Prevent Concentrations 
The modeling process ties the company's exposures with storm or 
earthquake frequency/severity information to determine the potential 
losses. The output of simulation modeling can provide considerable 
information beyond the potential loss levels and their attendant proba-
bilities. An important byproduct of the modeling is information on the 
concentration of the company's losses. 
With the introduction of computer mapping products, pin maps 
have been resurrected. Mapping packages can profile exposure con-
centrations on a county or zip code basis or, if necessary, show point 
locations. Mapping today is limited by the amount of exposure location 
information retained by insurance companies. Because most compa-
nies now retain zip code detail, the following section will assume this 
level of detail. 
Summing exposures by zip code can be misleading, as zip codes can 
vary significantly in size. Using exposure densities can solve this prob-
lem. Exposures are summed by zip code and divided by the number 
of square miles within the zip code to yield the exposure density. Ex-
posure density mapping tends to accentuate those inner city zip codes 
where more exposure typically is concentrated in a smaller area. Zip 
code exposure densities do not identify exposure concentrations within 
a zip code. 
Analyzing loss potentials by examining only exposure densities can 
be misleading. Loss densities should be used. Loss densities are cre-
ated by simulating a library of storms and retaining the losses on a zip 
code level. The losses on a per storm basis are multiplied by the prob-
ability of each event. After the losses are aggregated for all storms, the 
losses for a zip code are divided by the square miles within the zip code. 
The loss density maps combine both the exposure concentrations and 
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the frequency and severity of catastrophic events in that zip code. Loss 
densities can be used to determine catastrophic loss costs for ratemak-
ing. The following maps show an example of the exposure density and 
loss density maps (Figures 1 and 2 respectively) for the northeast region 
for a sample insurance company. 
Another graphical representation of a company's exposures is a his-
togram. Histograms can show the relative loss by landfall area for a 
specific type of storm or return period storm. These storms could be 
a specific class hurricane or they could be the 95th percentile storms 
for each area. Figures 3 and 4 are histograms showing the hypothetical 
results for the industry (Figure 3) and for sample insurance company 
(Figure 4). As can be seen from these histograms, our sample insur-
ance company has significantly greater exposure to a hurricane hitting 
central Florida than the industry does. The results of modeling can be 
used to decide the most appropriate actions to address problem areas. 
The most likely areas of action are marketing, underwriting, pricing, 
and reinsurance. 
For many companies, the focus of marketing is their agency force. 
They can select, within limits, where to appoint their agents, how much 
business they will accept from each agent, and where that business is 
located. The results of probabilistic modeling can help a company con-
siderably in this area. From those results management can determine 
which agents are producing business with a disproportional potential 
for catastrophic losses and work with those agents to reduce writings 
to acceptable levels while minimizing the effect on the agent. The com-
pany can identify areas where new agents can more safely be appointed, 
so that additional writings will not exacerbate the exposure problem. 
Similarly, underwriting standards can be established that discourage 
business in areas of dangerous concentration, while encouraging busi~ 
ness elsewhere. 
Modeling can be used for many purposes: 
• To monitor the catastrophe potential in all areas of the country; 
• To warn of growing levels of concentration before they become a 
problem. 
• To test the effects of various underwriting actions such as in-
creased deductibles, policy sublimits, and selective policy non-
renewals; and 
• To identify those areas for more stringent individual risk protec-
tion requirements. 
Pin maps are back! 
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Figure 2 
Northeast Region Loss Density 
Densities based on Zip Code, County Boundaries overlaid on top. 
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5 Reinsurance and Excess Modeling 
There was a dramatic drop in catastrophe reinsurance availability 
following Hurricane Andrew. This drop was caused by fears among the 
reinsurers that they had become overextended in catastrophe business 
and that they needed to better control their aggregate exposures. The 
demise of the London Market Excess (LMX) market contributed to a 
reduction in retrocessional capacity available to reinsurers who wrote 
larger lines than were prudent. Reinsurance markets cut the capacity. 
Modeling allows a reinsurer to measure potential exposures, so that 
it can more efficiently write business while safeguarding its assets. 
Models allow it to measure the maximum losses possible to certain 
events, so that it isn't restricted to a certain amount of aggregate limit in 
an arbitrary geographic zone. By tying the models to the underwriting 
process, the reinsurer can determine the effect on its concentrations 
from adding a contract. This ability to better measure potential losses 
increases the underwriter's willingness to accept additional contracts, 
thus increasing the availability of reinsurance in the market. 
5.1 Does Market Share Analysis Work? 
Unfortunately, modeling for reinsurers is not as easy as it is for 
primary companies. This is due to the differences in available data and 
the additional complexity of contract conditions. 
Most primary companies have detailed exposure data, at least by 
zip code, allowing the modeler to estimate losses at that level. Until re-
cently, however, reinsurers have been limited to premium data by state. 
This lack of detailed data necessitated a modeling approach wherein 
losses first were simulated for the entire insurance industry, then the in-
dividual ceding company losses were estimated using its market share. 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the market share loss estimate 
and the actual loss for individual companies. There is little correlation 
between the two for individual companies. 
Market share analysis for earthquake is even more difficult because 
current line of business structures do not define whether earthquake 
coverage is provided. For example, personal earthquake coverage can 
be reported under homeowners or personal earthquake policies. 
In late 1993 exposure data by county were requested by many of the 
more technical reinsurance markets. This data enhanced reinsurers' 
abilities to estimate primary companies' losses, but not to the level of 
accuracy n~eded to price reinsurance. 
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Market share analysis is even less accurate when modeling excess 
property or large account business. A market share approach for an 
excess writer treats that business as ground-up business (Le., losses 
without reflection of deductibles), totally distorting the potential to the 
company. Similarly, large account businesses rarely carry accurate lo-
cation codes on all the buildings in a schedule. Even if county exposure 
information is available, it is possible that the location data refer to 
the billing location rather than to the risk location. This type of cod-
ing usually puts large concentrations of exposure in a small number of 
locations, ignoring the real spread of risk. 
While market share analysis is a significant step forward in analyz-
ing reinsurers' loss potential, we believe that market share modeling 
based on county data leaves much to be desired. For instance, the dif-
ferences in damages for those zip codes along the coast versus those 
inland can be substantial, yet market share modeling does not differ-
entiate them. 
Market share modeling can be particularly misleading for a company 
with a distribution of risks within a county that is different from the 
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industry distribution. Until either actual zip code exposures of the de-
tailed results or the company's own modeling are readily available to the 
reinsurance market, the information used by all but the most sophis-
ticated reinsurance markets will continue to be inadequate to properly 
underwrite their book of business. The most sophisticated reinsurance 
markets are using zip code information to underwrite their book of 
business. 
One way to best utilize primary company modeling is for a rein-
surer or the market as a whole to define a set of standard scenarios, 
either probabilistic or deterministic, to be modeled against the primary 
company exposures. The reinsurer can calculate contract losses based 
on contract terms to determine its portfolio losses from each scenario. 
This information provides a quantitative comparison of various con-
tracts as well as the effect of any new contract to the portfolio for un-
derwriting and priCing decisions. Adjustments may be necessary to 
compensate for differences among the various models used by the ced-
ing companies. 
5.2 How to Model Reinsurance Losses 
While primary company loss modeling usually can be done on a 
policy or aggregate basis, reinsurance modeling should be done on a 
contract by contract basis. Combining contracts with different policy 
limits, quota share percentages, and attachment points can distort the 
modeling results. 
Losses should be calculated using the total values exposed and then 
limited based upon the conditions of the reinsurance contracts. Policy 
limits apply to each individual risk location, whereas loss limits apply 
to all locations. The combinations of different contracts reduce the 
ability to model losses appropriately. 
Mapping reinsured exposures is more difficult than primary com-
panyanalysis. For example, assume three risks are covered under a $10 
million excess $ 5 million reinsurance contract; see Table 1. Mapping 
the exposure to this policy could be done a number of ways. First, 
we could map the full exposure for each risk. The problem with this 
method is that it can overstate the importance of Risk B. Second, we 
could map the exposure inside the excess of loss on a per risk basis 
($10 million for Risk B, $7 million for Risk C). But this method ignores 
Risk A. 
One answer to catastrophe exposure mapping is to run the proba-
bilistiC database against all exposures. One event could cause losses to 
both Risk A and Risk B so that each reSUlting loss within the excess of 
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Table 1 
Excess Reinsurance Contract Data 
Losses City 
Risk A $ 3 million Palm Beach 
Risk B $40 million 
Risk C $12 million 
Miami 
Atlanta 
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loss agreement would be spread proportionately to each risk. Unlike 
the first suggestion, the exposure from Risk B would not be overem-
phasized. Unlike the second mapping suggestion, the exposure from 
Risk A can contribute toward losses. 
Models that use only mean damage factors can distort loss potential, 
especially when an excess contract is being modeled. It is possible that 
using mean damage factors will result in an estimate of no losses to an 
excess contract, when losses are possible. For example, assume that 
a specific wind speed causes an average of 15 percent damage to a 
specific type of building. Within each estimate of damage, no matter 
how defined (frame construction, shingled hip roof), there always exists 
a range of damage potential. Risks having an average of 15 percent 
damage may consist of some risks having 5 percent damage and some 
having 75 percent damage. It is possible that the one risk having 75 
percent damage may hit the reinsurance layer. In modeling reinsurance 
layers it is important to build in the variation in loss severity. The 
variation in damage severity can be built into the engineering module. 
5.3 Payback 
One of the pricing concepts in the catastrophe reinsurance market is 
that of payback or return time. When an underwriter considers the price 
he or she will charge for a treaty, the underwriter determines an approx-
imate frequency of an event that will affect the layer in question. Thus, 
if the actuary is pricing a layer $25,000,000 excess of $25,000,000, he 
or she needs an idea of how often to expect an occurrence that "'rill 
cause a loss to the ceding company of more than $25,000,000. If the 
actuary believes that such an event will happen every five years and 
that every such event will exceed $50,000,000, the actuary can esti-
mate the amount necessary to charge for the loss portion of the price. 
Simply put, a $25,000,000 limit with a five year payback should cost 
$5,000,000, plus provisions for expenses, risk load, and profit. In 
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reality, this exercise is not as simple, but one can determine the ex-
pected cost in the $25,000,000 excess of $25,000,000 layer using a loss 
likelihood l curve produced from the probabilistic storm database. 
Catastrophe modeling can help the underwriter estimate these re-
turn times or paybacks. By modeling the ceding company's exposures, 
the reinsurer can simulate the effects of various events on the proposed 
layers to be offered. The probabilities of loss levels that will hit each 
layer can be calculated; the underwriter can convey the probabilities 
(e.g., 5 percent) to return times (e.g., 20 years). 
5.4 Additional Contract PriCing 
The term additional contract pricing refers to determining the pric-
ing and acceptability of a contract based upon the marginal profit and 
marginal risk that the contract adds to the portfolio. The adjustment 
for risk is based on how much the ne,,,' contract adds to the chance of 
overconcentration. Using this method of judging a contract seems to 
give undo favoritism to those contracts written before the reinsurer has 
enough business to threaten overconcentration. From the reinsurer's 
point of view, however, once its capacity has been filled, it is less will-
ing to write an additional contract and should be paid handsomely for 
doing so. Catastrophe modeling can be used to measure both the indi-
vidual expected cost and marginal cost. 
6 Pricing and Reinsurance Allocation Issues 
Simulation models provide a long-needed tool to determine appro-
priate provisions for catastrophe losses in the primary rates. They can 
provide an estimate of the long range expected loss to the peril being 
modeled, and they can do this at the zip code level of detail. An actuary 
can combine zip codes into homogeneous territories to determine the 
appropriate catastrophe pure premium that should be included in the 
rate. A significant risk load also is warranted, given the level of uncer-
tainty in writing catastrophic coverages. The loss distribution from the 
model can provide a starting point for estimating the risk load. 
Similarly, a company can use modeling in determining appropriate 
allocations of its reinsurance costs. By running the probabilistic mod-
eling against a company's exposures and its reinsurance program, the 
IThe term toss likelihood is used loosely. Loss likelihood refers to the probability 
of a specific size loss (0.1 percent) or the return time in the number of years (1/0.1 
percent = 1,000 years). 
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relative expected losses can be calculated for each layer by zip code. 
These expected losses can be combined to give the relative amount 
that a territory or state contributes to the catastrophe potential and, 
thus, the need for reinsurance. These indicated contributions can be 
used by the company in its decisions on rates, profit sharing, or agent 
compensation. 
When establishing a price for a cover as uncertain as property catas-
trophe reinsurance the risk load becomes crucial. Actual risk loads 
charged in the market are most likely implicit in the market price and 
not actuarially determined. Modeling can provide the raw material for 
calculating a theoretical risk load for a technically oriented organiza-
tion. The actuary can determine a measure of variation, e.g., the vari-
ance, from the loss distribution that results from a probabilistic model. 
This measure can be used to determine an appropriate risk load. 
7 Conclusion 
The risk of catastrophes to a portfolio of property exposures has 
been a problem for insurers in the recent past. The need to measure the 
extent of potential damage to a company is crucial, and the recent de-
velopment of computer simulation modeling has provided techniques 
to measure this risk. Catastrophe modeling can be used for manag-
ing exposure concentrations, determining reinsurance programs, and 
pricing. Rating agencies such as A.M. Best and Standard & Poors re-
quire exposure management and catastrophe modeling for companies 
to retain a strong financial rating. 
Models should be evaluated more for their qualitative value than for 
their quantitative value. Models are most useful when comparing the 
relative losses from specific events to different locations or different 
construction types. Models, however, seem to be graded more upon 
their ability to forecast damages from speCific events such as Hurri-
cane Andrew or the Northridge earthquake. To achieve greater individ-
ual event accuracy, several additional components need to be modeled. 
For hurricane/wind modeling, additional items such as rainfall, storm 
duration, humidity, downbursts, etc. need to be modeled. In addition, 
more detailed exposure data including door and window detail, roof 
sheathing attachment, and roof coverings are needed for more accu-
rate projections of damages from such winds in a single event. 
Catastrophe modeling today can be compared to some of the more 
rudimentary reserving methods. Neither of these approaches will pro-
duce the best answer in many situations; they are both rough estimates. 
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Just as a reserving actuary should use a number of reserving methods 
to estimate future liabilities, a pricing or reinsurance actuary should 
use more than one model when evaluating the catastrophe risk. Ev-
ery model contains hundreds of assumptions. Scientists and engineers 
agree to disagree within their own fields on items such as return times 
of events or on the damageability of properties. Until these fields can 
come to a consensus, catastrophe models will differ. Recent hearings 
of the Florida Hurricane Commission on Loss Projection Methodologies 
show that while each model has reasonable assumptions, model results 
can vary immensely. As work in the catastrophe modeling field grows 
and as exposure data improve, more complicated and precise methods 
will develop. 
Measuring the risk is only the first step. Management must manage 
its concentrations of exposure so that the company is not susceptible to 
bankruptcy when a catastrophe occurs. Simulation modeling is a help-
ful tool in this effort, but must be just one component of an integrated 
catastrophe management process. 
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Discussion of Ronald T. Kozlowski and Stuart B. 
Mathewson's "Measuring and Managing 
Catastrophe Risk" 
Rade T. Musulin* 
1 Introduction 
Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Mathewson's paper provides a good intro-
duction to the development and use of models in the property insurance 
industry. It will be a valuable addition to the regrettably sparse actuar-
ialliterature in this area. This discussion will offer several comments 
on the ideas raised in the paper, focusing on how models can be used 
to enhance an actuary's work. 
The use of models has sparked major controversies between regula-
tors and insurers in several jurisdictions, notably Florida. Controversy 
is not limited to the regulatory arena, however. Because models are 
being used by reinsurers to rate contracts and by A.M. Best to rate com-
panies, management often must react to the application of modeling 
to the company. Many insurance company executives find themselves 
arguing with regulators for higher primary rate levels based on models 
but chafing under reinsurance costs developed using the same models. 
*Mr. Musulin, A.C.A.S., M.A.A.A. is vice president and actuary at the Florida Farm 
Bureau Insurance Companies. His actuarial duties include property ratemaking, devel-
opment of concentration control strategies, and reinsurance management. In addition, 
he is responsible for the company's legislative affairs and industry relations. He serves 
on several industry committees, including the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund Ad-
visory Council. He graduated from Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, in 1979 with 
a degree in applied mathematics from the College of Engineering. 
Mr. Musulin's address is: Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, P.O. Box 147030, 
Gainesville FL 32614-7030, U.S.A. Internet address: Rade@afn.org 
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2 Ratemaking: Models VS. Traditional Approaches 
2.1 Loss Cost Issues 
In the introduction the authors discuss how events of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s led to severe disruptions in property insurance mar-
kets. The factors driving the property insurance crisis are complex and 
beyond the scope of their paper. A brief discussion of how traditional 
actuarial methods led to errors in estimates of loss costs and probable 
maximum losses, however, is an excellent way to emphasize the need 
for the development of computer models. 
Ratemaking problems developed due to: 
• An abnormal lull in catastrophic activity; 
• A substantial shift of population to high risk areas; 
• Use of actuarial techniques \"'hose basic assumptions were vio-
lated by both of the above factors; and 
• Limited availability of data and the computer power necessary to 
analyze it. 
Prior to the late 1980s actuaries used a technique known as the ex-
cess wind procedure to estimate hurricane catastrophe provisions in 
rates. This technique examines the ratio of excess to normal losses in 
statewide aggregations of annual loss data and measures excess losses 
as those that exceed some multiple of a long-term mean. Losses above 
this threshold are excluded from the traditional five year ratemaking 
experience period and spread over a long (30 year) experience period. 
This method assumes that the last 30 years were typical in terms of 
storm frequency/severity and that the ratio of wind to non-wind (Le., 
fire, theft, and liability) losses is constant over time. Both of these as-
sumptions were grossly violated from 1960 to 1990 by abnormally low 
hurricane activity and explosive population growth in coastal areas. 
In 1992 the Insurance Service Office calculated an excess wind fac-
tor of l.14 for Florida homeowners, which would have generated ap-
proximately $80 million in premiums for the entire Florida insurance 
industry annually.! At this funding rate it would have taken over 100 
IThis figure is developed as follows: Total homeowners premium volume was ap-
proximately $1 billion. Assuming an expected loss ratio of 65 percent, this yields $650 
million in loss cost, which equals normal losses multiplied by 1.14. Thus, normal losses 
were $570 million, leaving $80 million for excess catastrophe losses. While this calcu-
lation is a crude approximation of a complicated ratemaking process, it illustrates the 
magnitude of the pricing error. 
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years just to pay for Hurricane Andrew's homeowner losses, assuming 
no other storms in the interim. 
Computer modeling techniques now allow actuaries to project the 
actual storm data of the 1920s onto the population and construction 
patterns of the 1990s, overcoming the limitations of the prior method. 
2.2 Risk Load Issues 
The authors also discuss the relationship between the purchase of 
reinsurance and primary price adequacy. In their Section 1 (fifth para-
graph) the authors state "Without reinsurance costs these companies 
were able to write business at lower prices and thereby increase their 
market share, .... " This raises another significant point about the ac-
tuarial techniques employed in the past. 
Risk loads generally are considered to be an essential ingredient of 
an actuarially sound rate in lines subject to highly variable losses. While 
reinsurers long have considered risk load explicitly in their ratemaking, 
traditional primary rate making procedures used in property ratemak-
ing did not. Companies that purchase reinsurance and reflected those 
costs in primary rates thereby included some risk load. 
Standard techniques used by many insurers and rating bureaus for 
primary rate making focused on mean loss costs, ignoringiPotential vari-
ance of these loss costs. Risk loads were accounted for in profit and 
contingency factors often set using rule-of-thumb figures such as 5 per-
cent or industry average return on equity adjusted for anticipated in-
vestment income. It has not been unusual for primary profit and con-
tingency factors to be the same for low risk auto physical damage and 
high risk coastal homeowners. Even rarer was any consideration of dif-
fering risk load within a book of business. One might expect that a risk 
load would be different for homeowner risks in coastal areas versus 
risks in inland areas, but the notion of varying the risk load within a 
filing was virtually nonexistent. 
As is the case with loss costs, computer models provide a wealth of 
information to actuaries on the variance and skewness of the aggregate 
loss distribution. The authors note that modeling provides the raw 
material for calculating theoretical risk loads, but they discuss the issue 
only in the context of pricing property catastrophe reinsurance. The 
issue is also of critical importance in pricing primary insurance; the lack 
of generally accepted actuarial and regulatory methods of handling this 
problem is related directly to the shortage of primary insurer capacity 
in high risk areas. 
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3 Building Models 
3.1 Exposure Considerations 
Their paper discusses the key elements of exposure data needed in 
the modeling process. But the actuary should not forget that the expo-
sure on the statistical record may not be the actual level of exposure 
on which the loss will be adjusted. For example, many companies of-
fer guaranteed replacement cost coverage that will pay the insured an 
amount greater than that shown on the policy declaration if the actual 
loss exceeds that amount. This feature contributed to far greater than 
expected losses in Hurricane Andre,,,', when a demand surge for mate-
rials and labor caused prices to inflate after the loss. The actuary must 
understand what policy provisions may be lurking behind the statistical 
records in order to accurately use a computer model. 
Insurance to value is also critical. Most models assume that property 
is insured to 100 percent of replacement cost. If the company insures 
to 80 percent of value, the reduction in expected losses will not be 20 
percent because most catastrophe losses are not total. 2 The actuary 
must work with the modeling vendor to correctly adjust for the actual 
insurance-to-value practices of the company. 
The authors state in their Section 2.2: "Replacement cost and insur-
ance-to-value provisions identify those provisions where the insurance 
coverage may be greater than the specified coverage amount." Company-
speCific practices in these areas could result in insurance coverage ei-
ther above or below the speCified coverage amount. For example, most 
models assume replacement cost, but the company's contract provi-
sions may provide for actual cash value settlement of contents or roof 
claims. 
3.2 Statistical Considerations 
The authors make a key point that most insurance company prop-
erty statistical systems are designed for traditional perils of fire and 
2For example, consider two $100,000 houses, one insured for $100,000 and the 
other for $80,000. A partial loss requiring the roof to be replaced will result in the 
same loss to the insurer on both homes. Because only a small proportion of risks is 
totally destroyed in a given event, the reduction in insured losses must be less then the 
reduction in coverage amount when a book of business' insurance to value standard 
is reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent. If actuaries are not careful, a mismatch 
of assumption between the modeler and the company can lead to significant errors in 
estimated losses. 
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theft, rather than wind or earthquake. Thus, the actuary may have de-
tailed coding on whether a home has fire extinguishers or how close 
it is to a fire hydrant, but no information on type of roof, existence of 
storm shutters, etc. Addressing this issue is perhaps the most daunt-
ing challenge modelers face in improving accuracy, given the enormous 
expense that is required to change established statistical systems. 
3.3 The Authors' Insurance Coverage Module 
The reader may gain additional insight into the authors' presentation 
of the insurance coverage module by more fully exploring the assump-
tions underlying their equation (6), which is repeated here for conve-
nience: 
(ID)z iID(Dz,r,d,l) 
min[max[(r x D z ) - d, 0], l] + a x Dz 
where 
(ID)z Insured damage at location z; 
Dz Damage at location z; 
r Guaranteed replacement cost multiplier; 
d Deductible; 
Reinsurance limit; and 
a ALAE percentage. 
This form assumes (i) a single risk subject to a per risk excess contract 
that does not cover loss adjustment expense; (ii) guaranteed replace-
ment cost applies; and (iii) ALAE is a function of damage (excluding 
guaranteed replacement cost and deductible). 
If we assume, however, (i) the risk ,,,,ere subject to quota share rein-
surance (at percentage q); (ii) guaranteed replacement cost applies; (iii) 
ALAE is assumed to be a function of loss adjusted for guaranteed re-
placement cost before application of the deductible; and (iv) ALAE is 
covered under the quota share, then 
(ID)z = [max[(r x Dz) - d, 0] + r x a x Dz] x (1 - q). 
This example illustrates the importance of constructing the insurance 
coverage module with a full understanding of the underlying assump-
tions. Actual insurance coverage models can become extremely com-
plex, particularly if several types of poliCies with differing reinsurance 
coverages are involved. 
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4 Exposure Management Considerations 
The authors discuss several techniques to locate and prevent dan-
gerous concentrations. Their main focus is the aggregate level of ex-
posure in a given area and its density within a given zip code. They 
show how models can be used to estimate loss potentials and control 
the writing of business in areas of dangerous concentration. I see this 
problem from a slightly different perspective. The analysis should not 
be limited to the quantity of risk, but also should consider the types 
of risks within a given area of concentration, their levels of coverage, 
etc. The model can be used to devise strategies (such as making cov-
erage changes) to manage the exposure without necessarily reducing 
writings. 
The key issue facing a company is how to decide whether $X of ag-
gregate liability can be supported by the company's capitalization and 
reinsurance. From this standpoint, $100 million of concrete bunkers 
may be as attractive as $10 million of glass greenhouses. Holding con-
struction constant, $100 million in exposure in Inland City may be as 
attractive as $20 million in Beach City. The probable maximum loss of a 
$100 million aggregate exposure in Inland City at a $250 deductible may 
equal a $100 million aggregate exposure in Beach City with a 5 percent 
deductible. Comparisons of this type require models-comparisons 
cannot be performed by simply looking at aggregations of exposure 
on a map. 
5 Reinsurance and Excess Modeling 
In this section of the paper the authors discuss how modeling can 
increase availability of reinsurance coverage in the market. It is also 
important to understand the relationship between the use of models 
among reinsurers, primary companies, and regulators. 
As the authors note, models help reinsurers to measure potential 
losses more accurately, increasing their confidence in both pricing and 
amount of capital exposed. Unfortunately, unless the reinsured pri-
mary company also considers modeled loss costs and an appropriate 
risk load in its rates, there will be insufficient funds to pay for needed 
reinsurance, leading to the appearance of a capacity shortage. Even if 
the reinsurer and primary reinsurer can synchronize their priCing, a 
clash between an unregulated reinsurance market and the highly reg-
ulated primary market still can pose difficulties. Thus, it is important 
that a common understanding of the elements of modeled loss costs 
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and needed risk loads be developed between reinsurers, primary insur-
ers, and regulators. 
The authors do an excellent job of showing why the traditional prac-
tice of using a market share analysis to estimate individual company 
loss potential is seriously flawed. I have had firsthand experience with 
the pitfalls of using market share-based methods by working for an in-
surer that specializes in farm insurance. The company's book of busi-
ness contains a large amount of rural property in Florida. The rural 
book's high fire rates cause the premium market share to be substan-
tially higher than the exposure market share. The market share ap-
proach also assumes that the farms are distributed in the same manner 
as the population, which generally lives much closer to the coast. The 
combination of these factors leads to dramatic differences between loss 
estimates derived from geocoded exposure data and premium-driven 
county market share estimates. 
Market share approaches also are biased by the level of rate ad-
equacy in the company, with more adequately rated companies hav-
ing relatively higher market shares and apparently greater loss poten-
tials. This creates the ironic situation whereby companies that ought 
to be viewed more favorably by reinsurers (due to adequate rates and 
a greater ability to afford coverage) appear to be less desirable because 
their rate-inflated market shares overstate their true catastrophic loss 
exposure. 
For these reasons, the ability of primary company actuaries to pro-
vide their reinsurance counterparts with high quality information is 
critical. 
6 Pricing and Reinsurance Allocation Issues 
The authors state that modeling can be used to help a company 
determine the appropriate allocations of reinsurance costs. An often 
neglected but important area of actuarial work is the communication 
of the components of rate levels to other persons in the organization. 
Consider the example of an undenvriter making decisions on agent 
performance based on a loss ratio. Often such loss ratios are direct 
incurred loss over earned premium, with an adjustment to remove large 
or catastrophic losses in consideration for some reinsurance cost. If the 
underwriter has two agents writing property insurance, one in Beach 
City and another in Inland City, it is likely that the rate level in Beach 
City has a significant catastrophic load. If the loss ratio described above 
is used without an accurate allocation of the reinsurance cost, the Beach 
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City agent can be expected to post a better loss ratio, even if the book 
is less profitable. The underwriter could draw inaccurate conclusions 
about the profitability of the book and write more business at a less 
adequate rate. This could prompt the actuary to raise the price, leading 
the underwriter's report to show the Beach City agent to be even more 
profitable, and thus continuing the cycle. 
In situations such as this, the actuary must use tools such as catas-
trophe models to assure that internal management information reports 
allow users to make accurate decisions. The actuary's job does not end 
when the rate filing is approved. 
7 Conclusion 
Computer modes will become increaSingly important to actuaries in 
coming years. An actuary's ability to use these tools effectively is criti-
cal to the future health of our organizations and the property insurance 
industry as a whole. Actuaries must playa key role in educating the 
public about this issue and must combat the impression that models 
are incomprehensible black boxes. 
Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Mathewson's paper is an important step to ed-
ucate the actuarial profeSSion about the development and use of catas-
trophe models. I share their hope that the paper Vl111 stimulate new 
modeling ideas and enhancements. 
Authors' Reply to Discussion 
Ronald T. Kozlowski and Stuart B. Mathewson 
We greatly appreciate the discussion of our paper that Mr. Musulin 
has pr0\1ded. It adds further understanding to the use of catastrophe 
loss modeling in property insurance management. 
Mr. Musulin commented that in 1992 the Insurance Services Office 
(ISO) used an excess mnd factor based upon historical loss informa-
tion. Today ISO recognizes the value of catastrophe modeling and now 
. creates loss costs using these same models. 
In his discussion of the insurance coverage module, Mr. Musulin 
. expands the formula that we offered. We would like to clarify that 
the formula in our paper was simply a representative way to view the 
process. There are a myriad of possible combinations that will govern 
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terms. The equation also varies depending upon whether policy levels 
or aggregated exposure data are provided. The discussant has shown 
how one of those more complex situations can be represented. We are 
grateful for Mr. Musulin's additional equation, as it gives one example 
of the complications that can arise in modeling insured loss, given a 
certain amount of damages to the insured property. 
In Mr. Musulin's discussion of the section on reinsurance and excess 
modeling, he re-emphasizes the problem between pricing an unregu-
lated reinsurance market and a highly regulated primary market. In 
some states regulators allow catastrophe reinsurance to be loaded as 
an expense in primary company rates. 
We also would like to add that additional research can improve sig-
nificantly the results of these models. The insurance industry needs 
more information about the long-term history of catastrophic occur-
rences as well as better information on actual building damage from 
these events. Today catastrophe modelers are using historical weather 
data from the past 100 years to predict losses at return times of 250 
years or more. Current scientific research using pollen dating, coastal 
sediment, and tree rings can be used to estimate hurricane severity 
thousands of years ago. Earthquake scientists also are using new meth-
ods to better estimate earthquake frequency. For instance, paleoscis-
mologists are using evidence from trenching to uncover evidence of 
large earthquakes that occurred before records were kept. 
We believe that the insurance industry would be best served if insur-
ance companies would pool their catastrophe loss data to validate the 
damage functions used in catastrophe models. These data should be 
provided in detail by location indicator (e.g., zip code), by construction, 
by policy type, and by any other factor deemed important to damage es-
timation. This type of validation should convince doubters that models 
are credible in their calculation of damages 
Again, we thank Mr. Musulin for his thoughtful discussion, as it of-
fers Significant additional insight into this area. 

Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 3, No.2, 1995 
Sensitivity Testing of Prdperty/Casualty Cash Flows 
Ralph S. Blanchard, 111* and Eduardo P. Marchenat 
Abstract* 
The paper outlines an approach that has evolved at Aetna through ten 
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1 Introduction 
The late 1970s and early 1980s was a time of volatile financial con-
ditions. Interest rates had risen to unprecedented levels. In this en-
vironment, statutory annual statements were inadequate to assess a 
company's financial condition. This provided the impetus to perform 
an analysis focusing on financial strength in its most basic form: the 
ability of a company to meet its cash obligations during periods of ad-
verse financial and experience conditions. The first property/casualty 
"mismatch", i.e., interest rate risk, analysis was completed by Aetna's 
corporate actuarial department in July 1982. It took the form of a cash 
flow runoff of the company's December 31, 1981 balance sheet. 
Since 1982 the analysis has been performed annually. While the 
first study's focus was interest rate risk, the focus has shifted as we 
have come to better understand the major risk factors affecting the 
property/casualty balance sheet. Today, the analysis focuses on de-
fault risk for bonds and commercial mortgages, refinancing risk for 
commercial mortgages, certain off-balance sheet risks, and reserve de-
velopment risk. Interest rate risk is still evaluated, primarily via asset 
prepayment scenarios and present value measures, but interest rate 
effects are secondary to the other risk factors in their importance to 
the overall property/casualty cash flows. This is because of the rela-
tively short duration of property/casualty liabilities,l the lack of any 
call risk for these liabilities (unlike many life insurance products),2 and 
the fact that the level of liability is not directly a function of interest 
rates (again unlike many life insurance products). Our analysis tech-
niques have tended to evolve as the various sources of risk have become 
better understood to us (e.g., CMO risk in 1992).3 
1 It is rare to see a total property/casualty ("p/c") company liability duration over 4. 
2P/C liabilities are also either fixed or a function of inflation, not a function of 
interest rates. PIC liabilities correlation with interest rates exists only to the extent that 
interest rates correlate with current inflation. These pic vs.life liability differences also 
produce significant contrasts in the focus of our analysis vs. traditional life analysis. 
We do not construct life "like" interest rate scenarios and we do not explicitly model 
asset reinvestments or disinvestments (the short durations make reinvestment risk a 
non-issue). Interest rate scenario issues related to coordinating projected liability cash 
flows with asset cash flows are largely "non-issues" for pic. 
3 A collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) is a mortgage-backed security sup-
ported by a nonproportional sharing of the principal (and/or associated interest) pay-
ments from a pool of mortgages. For example, an individual CMO could be supported 
by the first (or last) X dollars of principal payments/prepayments. The mortgage prin-
cipal repayments (and/or their associated interest payments) are separated, based on 
repayment date, into short-, medium-, and long-term segments. 
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Over the years the results have been presented to senior manage-
ment and to rating agencies. The analysis also has been used by Aetna's 
property/casualty portfolio managers as a tool in understanding the 
cash needs of the business (on a runoff basis) and in managing the de-
gree of mismatch between the asset cash flows of their portfolios and 
the cash flows of the liabilities.4 
This paper focuses on how we have modeled expected asset cash 
flows (following statutory annual statement page 2 line categories) and 
the approach we have taken to shocks certain asset categories to reflect 
defaults, prepayments, and refinancing (for mortgages). This baseline 
and shock modeling have been done on a deterministic, rather than on 
a stochastic basis because our focus has been what it would take to 
break the bank, not on the probability of surviva1.6 
For non-invested assets, the discussion will be brief except for the 
accrued retro premium account (line 9.3).7 We will discuss how we tie 
this item to loss assumptions. 
Certain items on the liability side also will be discussed, but in a 
summary fashion.s The most significant of these liability items are 
the emergence of possible adverse loss development and the runoff of 
existing unexpired policies. 
4While the model only projects runoff flows, some components of it also have been 
used to model various ongoing business flows on an ad hoc basis. As the requirements 
for dynamic solvency analysis develop, we expect to use more of the model's output 
and modules for ongoing business cash flow analysis, with the possible expansion of 
the entire model in the future for ongoing business scenarios. 
5The term shock is used throughout this paper to refer to the process of subjecting 
a financial asset or liability to an extreme scenario. 
6We leave a full discussion of stochastic versus deterministic modeling for future 
papers. We can say, however, that many of the past property/casualty shocks were not 
adequately predicted by stochastic models. For example, the January 1994 Northridge 
earthquake was deemed physically impossible by many earthquake risk models before 
the event. 
7This account reflects future premium collections expected on cost plus (i.e., retro) 
policies whereby the final premium is based on actual rather than expected losses. 
Due to the tendency of property casualty losses to develop (i.e., increase) over time for 
a single policy, premium tends to develop (i.e., increase) over time for a single retro 
policy. The result is a stream of retro premium collections almost as long as the loss 
payment pattern for a policy, causing significant dollars for this asset account. 
S As this paper focuses on asset risk rather than liability risk, only a summary of 
liability risks is given here. 
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2 Invested Assets 
In describing our cash flow analysis and how it begins each year, 
the key words are communication, communication, and communica-
tion. Reserve issues are identified through discussions with our prop-
erty/casualty reserve actuaries, cash flow methodology issues are dis-
cussed and peer review is solicited from our life actuaries, and invested 
asset issues are identified and discussed with our portfolio managers. 
These discussions also lead to adjustments in the detail9 in which the 
cash flows are modeled depending on whether there are any signifi-
cant unique (in terms of cash flow) items buried in the asset or liability 
categories of the balance sheet. 
For the invested assets we look to the portfolio managers for exper-
tise. We rely on them to provide the asset cash flows under various 
scenarios (based on individual asset characteristics). 
2.1 Bonds (Excluding Mortgage-Backed Securities)10 
2.1.1 Prepayment/Calls Risk 
Following these discussions bond cash flows are provided by the 
portfolio managers under three prepayment scenarios reflecting a range 
of possible interest rate conditions. The scenarios include a baseline 
scenario that reflects projected cash flows under current interest rate 
expectations, a shortest probable scenario that reflects the largest vol-
ume of prepayments expected if interest rates drop, and a longest prob-
able scenario reflecting the least volume of prepayments expected if 
interest rates rise . 
• Base Case Cash Flow-Callable bonds are assumed to call (or pre-
pay) if the coupon exceeds 150 basis points of projected treasury 
returns.!l 
• Shortest Probable Cash Flow-All callable bonds call at the earli-
est opportunity. 
9 Detail here refers to the number of different asset or liability classes. Our model 
generally deals with aggregate flows for an asset or liability class. Modeling of individ-
ual asset detail ''''ithin each class is done, but by our investment area in deriving the 
data feeds submitted to us. 
10 At the time we were developing our model, the only significant asset -backed secu-
rities Aetna held were mortgage-backed securities. Therefore, our model, and hence 
our paper, does not address other types of asset-backed securities. 
11 For the 1993 analysis interest rates were assumed to rise through 1998 and then re-
main level. (The 1 SO basis point criterion is specific to the composition of our portfolio.) 
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• Longest Probable Cash Flow-Bond cash flows follow prescribed 
sinking fund schedules/maturity dates. (Pre-refunded bonds are 
assumed to prepay.) 
The primary focus of the multiple scenarios is not anyone scenario; 
it is the range of results when different cash flows are combined with 
other balance sheet cash flows in our model. 
The key to reflecting prepayments in our bond cash flows rests with 
the modeling capability of our portfolio managers. The database they 
currently maintain contains specific contractual terms of each bond 
held-whether there is a call provision, the maturity date and coupon 
rate, and several other data fields. The database with its associated 
software is capable of modifying cash flows in response to specified 
criteria. 
2.1.2 Default Risk12 
The bond cash flows exclude bonds already in default, but make 
no allowances for future defaults. Some additional allowance must be 
made. Our current methodology does this by first determining a default 
rate and then shocking the bond cash flows for various multiples of that 
rate. An additional adjustment is made for recoveries from bonds in 
default. 
Selecting a Default Rate: We currently use three different methods to 
produce a default rate and then make a judgmental selection. 
The most scientific of our methods is based on the work of Altman 
(1989). Altman's principal message is that default risk is partly 
a function of time. Bonds rated AAA default less frequently than 
bonds rated BBB. But the longer into the future one goes, the more 
likely it is that today's AAA bonds will default. This makes intu-
itive sense, as no rating agency would rate a bond AAA if it faced 
significant default risk today. Over time, however, even strong 
companies can weaken and default. 
Altman includes a table of cumulative default rates by current 
bond rating and lag yearP This table is updated annually in a 
12This default risk models the risk of defaults across the entire portfolio, not the risk 
from asset concentration (Le., a significant portion of assets from a single issuer and 
subsequent default of that issuer). To date we have not found asset concentration to 
be a problem, partly due to the size of Aetna, and partly due to state laws limiting asset 
concentration for property/casualty investment portfolios. 
13For example, for bonds currently rated A, he shows the probability of default in 
one year, in two years, etc. 
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report published by Moody's Investors Service (1994). We ideally 
would apply this table of default rates, by bond rating and lag 
year, to our bond cash flows, by bond rating and lag year. In-
stead we have resorted to a simpler calculation, whereby we use 
a readily available statutory annual statement schedule (contain-
ing summarized principal flows for broad asset classes)14 to pro-
duce weighted average portfolio default rates by lag year. (See 
Appendix for more details.) This seems to produce reasonable 
numbers for about 14 lag years. The data underlying the default 
tables are too sparse beyond this period. 
Next we analyze our own historical bond default rates. This is a 
check on whether the previous method's result is reasonable. It 
also quantifies the value added by our own investment depart-
ment (in their independent analysis of borrower credit risk). 
After completing analyses with these two methods we are ready 
for a discussion with our investment department. We discuss our 
findings with respect to default rate assumptions, ask them what 
they think a reasonable default rate is (as our third method), and 
select a final estimate. 
We currently apply the same default rate assumption to every year 
of our bond flows. This is somewhat counter to Altman, whereby 
default rates should rise gradually over time. Our response is to 
pick a rate that is conservative for the first several years and in 
line with what we believe the default rate will be for the middle to 
later years. 
Applying the Selected Default Rate: After choosing the annual default 
rate assumption we apply it to the outstanding bond principal at 
each year end. We track the cumulative amount of total outstand-
ing principal defaulted for each year and assume the interest flow 
is reduced in the same proportion. For example, if we assume a 
2 percent default rate in years 1 and 2, then we assume that 4 
percent of year 2 interest disappears. 
Default Recoveries: It is rare when a bond defaults for creditors to 
lose all their investment. The Moody's report includes an analy-
sis of ultimate recovery rates, i.e., how many cents are recovered 
per dollar of prinCipal owed. Default recovery rates calculated this 
way are generally between 40 percent and 60 percent. We combine 
general data from such sources with input from our investment 
14Schedule D - Part lA of the property/casualty statutory annual statement. 
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department to select a recovery rate. The selected recovery rate 
then is applied to defaulted principal, and a lag of two years be-
tween year of default and year of recovery is used to model the 
default recoveries. 
2.2 Bonds: Mortgage-Backed Securities 
2.2.1 Prepayment/Calls Risk 
Mortgage-backed securities are instruments whose cash flows de-
pend on the cash flows from an underlying pool of mortgages. As 
the mechanism driving prepayments is different from other bonds, our 
portfolio managers model these assets separately. Our discussions with 
our portfolio managers have focused on two types of these securities: 
(i) mortgage pass-through securities, which are a straight percentage 
share of a pool of mortgage flows, and (ii) CMOs whereby the owner's 
share of the underlying pooled mortgage flows is not proportional.l s 
Fabozzi and Ferri (1991, Chapter 2, page 27) state: 
The cash flow for each class of CMO can be derived only by 
assuming some prepayment rate for the underlying mort-
gage collateral. The prepayment benchmark used by mort-
gage-backed securities dealers to quote CMO yields is the 
PSA16 standard prepayment model. 
In addition, Parseghian (1991, Chapter 29, page 632) states: 
The universe of CMO tranches17 has vastly differing sensi-
tivity to prepayment rates on underlying collateral. To the 
extent that this sensitivity causes risk, the investor must be 
compensated in the form of yield. 
For our model we see only an aggregation of cash flows for these se-
curities. The complex modeling issues related to CMO prepayments at 
Aetna are in the realm of portfolio managers. Our focus can be sum-
marized by three questions: 
1. Are the base case cash flows realistic in the current environment? 
lSOne example of a nonproportional sharing of these flows is to participate instead 
in the first X dollars of principal repaid. The varieties of nonproportional sharing of 
the underlying mortgage flows (principal and interest) are endless. 
16 Authors' note: PSA = Public Securities Association. 
17The segments of principal (and/or associated interest) repayments in a CMO are 
called trarlches. 
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2. How short could the flows get? And 
3. How long could the flows get? 
From Hu (1990): 
A mortgage pool whose prepayment experience conforms to 
the PSA pattern is said to prepay at 100 percent of the PSA 
model. Any slower or faster prepayment speed is a fraction 
or multiple of that PSA model. 
From about 1989 to 1992 our portfolio managers used the PSA method 
to produce cash flows for different interest rate scenarios. IS In those 
years we used 100 percent of PSA for our base case cash flow, ten times 
PSA for a scenario reflecting a significant drop in interest rates (Le., high 
prepayments,comparable to the shortest probable bond scenario), and 
50 percent of PSA for a scenario reflecting a rise in interest rates (Le., 
low prepayments, comparable to the longest probable bond scenario). 
In 1992 interest rates fell significantly, however, and as our dis-
cussions with portfolio managers progressed in early 1993 we became 
aware that the PSA-based model was not doing a good job of modeling 
prepayments on our CMOs. With preliminary analysis results already in 
hand, our portfolio managers provided new cash flows for CMOs. Re-
flecting the heavy volume of prepayments, the new flows showed sub-
stantially more cash in the early runoff years and substantially less in 
total. This strengthened our financial position with respect to interest 
rate risk at least, because the new asset cash flows were well-matched 
to our liability cash flOWS. 19 
Our portfolio managers continue to provide us with asset cash flows 
and prepayment scenarios reflecting separate treatment for mortgage-
backed securities. The modeling techniques for these assets have been 
changing, however, since the need became apparent during the 1992 
cash flow analysis. For our 1993 analysis our three mortgage-backed 
security cash flow scenarios were developed according to the following 
interest rate assumptions: 
IBThey also had the capability to develop expected prepayment rates based on the 
specific characteristics of each security held. The expected rate reflected two classes 
of factors: (i) demographic turnover (factors related to the personal characteristics of 
the mortgagor, e.g., persons tend to move after a certain number of years); and (ii) 
refinancing activity (factors reflecting the economic motivation of the mortgagor). 
19This is not unexpected for property/casualty insurance, as most property casualty 
companies manage their assets to a higher duration than their liabilities. This pur-
poseful mismatch results from a lack of call risk on the PIC liabilities. Given the lack 
of call risk, companies typically manage first to meet liquidity needs and then to maxi-
mize yield (by going long on the assets). The model being discussed is one way for PIC 
companies to evaluate the risk this strategy takes. 
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• Base Case Cash Flow-Interest rates remain at current levels. 
• Shortest Probable Cash Flow-Interest rate decrease 300 basis 
points from current levels. 
• Longest Probable Cash Flow-Interest rates increase 300 basis 
points from current levels. 
In determining these scenarios we asked portfolio managers for the 
longest and shortest cash flows possible in the context of changing 
interest rates (as well as their current base expectation).' In their judg-
ment the 300 basis point range produced the cash flow effects (on our 
portfolio) consistent with our request. 
Our experience with mortgage-backed security prepayments high-
lights a crucial point that applies to all our cash flows and to model-
ing generally: methods or experience that produced reasonable esti-
mates in the past may not produce reasonable estimates in the future. 
Again, the key to ensuring the validity of the modeled asset cash flows is 
communicatiori with those who are managing the assets and modeling 
the expected asset cash flows. They will know if economic conditions 
are producing asset behavior that is unexpected or differs significantly 
from past models. 
2.2.2 Default Risk 
For purposes of default we have not developed a separate approach 
(or rate) for mortgage-backed securities. The cash flows for these assets 
are aggregated with those of our other bonds, and the default method-
ology is applied in our model. 
This is consistent with how the bond default selections are made. 
The analysis using bonds by NAIC rating class includes all bonds, in-
cluding mortgage-backed ones. Therefore, we believe that, in total, our 
bond default assumptions are reasonable. The default assumptions 
should vary, however, if separate assumptions are made for mortgage-
backed bonds versus noncollateralized bonds. Many mortgage-backed 
securities include government agency guarantees (e.g., Ginnie Maes) 
with minimal, if any, default risk. 
This aggregation of all bond types for default risk purposes raises 
an important issue, namely the importance of defining in advance the 
scope of investment department discussions. Investment departments 
may not be organized in accordance with annual statement page 2 asset 
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categories.2o Separate departments may exist for private versus pub-
licly traded, mortgage-backed versus noncollateralized, and/or govern-
ment versus corporate bonds. When discussing asset risk parameters, 
care should be taken that all relevant portfolio managers are repre-
sented. Otherwise, one may find that the value selected to measure 
asset risk is reasonable only for a small segment of the assets in ques-
tion. 
2.3 Commercial Mortgages21 
2.3.1 Prepayment/Calls Risk 
When we raised the issue of modeling commercial mortgage prepay-
ment behavior with our portfolio managers, the discussion was short. 
Our portfolio managers looked quizzically at each other and answered 
"Mortgages don't prepay." 
Of course, our portfolio managers were not talking about residen-
tial mortgages. They were speaking about our portfolio of commercial 
mortgages. Because commercial property owners "'Tith mortgages MIl 
pass the cost of their mortgage debt to renters, the prepayment behav-
ior of these assets is different-they tend not to prepay. Also, in the 
economic climate of the early 1990s for commercial real estate, it was 
difficult for commercial mortgage loan holders to refinance even if they 
wanted to. This was a time of falling property values and tight credit-
prepayments were not a major issue. Under different circumstances a 
more careful analysis of the expected prepayments may be necessary. 
The significant issues in modeling commercial mortgage loan cash 
flows are default (and refinancing) and the underlying property values. 
2.3.2 Default/Refinancing Risk 
Our default analysis starts with the mortgages' contractual flows, 
with principal and interest flows separated, and balloon principal sep-
arated from other scheduled principal. Unfortunately, in the economic 
environment of the early 1990s contractual flows are probably not go-
ing to be realized, particularly for balloon mortgages. Therefore, our 
20The balance sheet is shown on the statutory annual statement pages 2 and 3 (assets 
and liabilities/surplus, respectively). 
21 We only address commercial mortgages because residential mortgage investments 
are rare. Mortgages in general are rare investments for most pic companies. Aetna 
has been an exception. In 1994 Aetna represented only about 2.3 percent of the pic 
industry's invested assets, but held nearly 48 percent of the industry's mortgages. 
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portfolio managers adjust the contractual mortgage flows to the extent 
that actual flows are expected to differ from the original contract terms. 
These adjustments are for specifically identified problem or near prob-
lem loans. Adjustments include refinancing loans (in which case our 
receipt of principal is delayed but we receive more interest payments), 
retiring the loan but at a reduced amount, and foreclosure. 
The refinancing risk is primarily in balloon mortgages. For these 
mortgages scheduled payments are generally interest only, with the en-
tire principal balance (the balloon) due upon maturity. For commercial 
mortgages the balloon can be large. The borrower typically never ex· 
pects to pay the debt, but instead to continually roll it over, i.e., pay the 
balloon with proceeds from a new loan. This may have worked during 
the real estate craze of the 1980s, but when real estate values dropped 
and credit tightened these borrowers found that they could not obtain 
refinanCing. As lenders we are left with a choice: either foreclose or 
extend the loans. 
The flows adjusted by portfolio managers reflect defaults, but only 
to the extent that defaults are known or considered likely on specific 
mortgages. In the language of asset impairment reserves, specific im-
pairments are reflected, general impairments are not. Therefore, to 
arrive at our base case mortgage cash flows including future default 
risk, we apply a selected default rate to the cash flows. The algorithm 
used to model the defaults is the same as for bonds. The assumptions 
on default rate, recovery rate, and lag between default and recovery, 
however, must be reviewed and changed if appropriate. 
For the recovery rate and lag we generally have taken a fairly broad 
approach. These assumptions have been selected based upon discus-
sions with our portfolio managers. (We generally look for assumptions 
that they judge to be reasonable but on the conservative side.) For the 
default rate we test the effects of various default rates and then dis-
cuss the various impacts with our mortgage portfolio managers. One 
perspective that we have found helpful is the reduction to the all time 
yield (in basis points) of the portfolio as implied by the cash flows. This 
can be measured by calculating the internal rate of return of the flows 
before and after application of the default rate. (All you need are the 
beginning outstanding principal and the cash flows.) 
With the base case mortgage cash flows set through this process, 
more adverse scenarios of mortgage experience are modeled by shock-
ing the flows at multiples of the base default rate. 
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2.4 Other Invested Assets (Including Stocks) 
Other invested assets include cash and short-term investments, stock, 
and real estate. At Aetna these assets are small in relation to bonds and 
mortgages, and our approach to modeling them is correspondingly sim-
ple. We generally have assumed that these assets are converted to cash 
in the first year of the runoff.22 
One exception is real estate. It may not be reasonable to assume 
that real estate can be sold within a year. Therefore, in our most recent 
analysis we differentiate between investment grade and foreclosed real 
estate and assume that the latter produces a three year cash flow at 
less than the current GAAP value. 
In evaluating these asset categories it is important to keep in mind 
that we are performing a runoff analysis, not a fire sale. This should be 
considered before one starts to convert occupied real estate and stock 
of affiliates to cash. We do not reflect any cash flows from these assets 
in our analysis. 
3 Non-Invested Assets 
The largest annual statement non-invested asset categories are typ-
ically agents balances (page 2, line 9 of the annual statement), rein-
surance recoverable on loss payments (page 2, line 12), and interest, 
dividends, and real estate income due and accrued (page 2, line 15). 
With the exception of the accrued retrospective premiums (the portion 
of agents balances relating to cost plus or retro policies, see footnote 
7), we assume that the cash is received in the first year of the runoff. 
We have not performed any analysis of collection risk associated with 
these items, relying instead on statutory non-admitted asset rules and 
Schedule F penalties23 to reflect collection risk. We do not reflect any 
cash flow for items such as property and equipment. 
3.1 Accrued Retrospective Premiums (A.S. Page 2, Line 9.3) 
Aetna has been a large commercial lines writer of retrospectively 
rated (Le.,retro) policies in the auto, general liability, and workers' com-
pensation lines of business. Hence, this asset has been significant for 
22Transaction costs of the sale could be reflected through a reduction to the assumed 
cash flow. 
23Schedule F is the property/casualty annual statement schedule showing informa-
tion on reinsurance transactions. Parts 4 through 7 are used to develop a penalty, 
essentially a formula-based credit risk reserve for reinsurance collection risk. 
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us. In our analysis we group this asset with our liabilities (showing it 
as a negative outflow) because the expected additional premiums are 
directly connected to the losses on this business. There are two aspects 
of the expected cash flows that we "'ill discuss here: the runoff of the 
held retro premium reserve and adverse loss development scenarios. 
The runoff (lines 9.3 and related impacts on lines 9.2 and 9.1)-
Agents balances (page 2, line 9) are split in the annual statement into 
three pieces: 
line 9.1 Premiums and agents' balances in course of collection; 
line 9.2 Premiums and agents' balances and installments booked but 
not yet due; 
line 9.3 Accrued retrospective premiums. 
When projecting how the accrued retrospective premium asset runs 
off, one must recognize that modeling the runoff of this asset is not 
the same as modeling cash receipts. 
The retro premium reserve represents future premiums to be writ-
ten as reported incurred losses (paid plus case basis reserves) develop 
on retrospectively rated poliCies. As the losses emerge, the additional 
premium is booked and then billed (Le., there is a shift-line 9.3 goes 
down and 9.1 goes up). As the bill is paid, line 9.1 goes down and cash 
goes up. On our book of business, hm''I'ever, it is not this straightfor-
ward. For some retro policies the amount of premium booked is based 
on reported incurred losses, but the amount billed is based on reported 
paid losses. In this case line 9.3 goes down by the amount booked, line 
9.1 goes up by the amount billed, and line 9.2 goes up by the difference 
between the booked and billed premium. (For statutory accounting, the 
amount in line 9.2 must be secured by a bank letter of credit or other 
collateral; otherwise it is non-admitted.) 
To reflect how the retro premium asset converts to cash (and also 
how line 9.2 becomes cash), it is necessary to understand the various 
billing arrangements available to the insured. In our case the cash is 
received more slowly than a pure runoff of the line 9.3 asset would 
indicate. 
Retro premiums and adverse loss development-While not a focus 
of this paper, adverse loss development scenarios are a major focus of 
our cash flow analysis. To model these adverse scenarios appropriately, 
it is necessary to recognize that with higher losses more retro premiums 
will be collected than what is anticipated by the held retro premium 
reserve. In our analysis we reflect additional retro premiums (above 
the held reserve level) in the following way: 
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• First, we separately identify how much of auto, general liability, 
and workers' compensation loss reserves are associated with retro 
policies. 
• We assume that the loss payment pattern is the same for both 
guaranteed cost and retrospectively rated business and that ad-
verse loss payments in each runoff year are split in the same pro-
portion as the original reserves. 
• For each runoff year we associate the marginal amount of in-
creased loss payments with a marginal increase in reported case 
reserves. We produce the case reserve increase by assuming that 
the case reserves will anticipate the future adverse loss payments 
for a specified horizon (Le., a specified number of future years).24 
• For each runoff year the product of the marginal increase in re-
ported case reserves and a retrospective premium responsive-
ness factor (developed through a separate review of the retro-
spective premium reserve) produces the additional retro premium 
received. The responsiveness factor is a ratio representing the 
expected additional premiums per dollar of additional reported 
loss. The factor incorporates, in aggregate, the individual charac-
teristics of all our retrospectively rated accounts, e.g., speCified 
aggregate loss limitations (maximums on the retro contract). 
Via an interpolation formula in our cash flow spreadsheet we 
cause the responsiveness factor to vary inversely with the sever-
ity of the loss development scenario. This reflects the fact that at 
higher levels of loss development more insureds will reach their 
maximums and the additional retro premiums received will di-
minish in relation to the amount of additional losses. 
We show the additional retro premiums received as offsets to the 
loss payments (Le., negative outflows). 
4 Loss Development 
Our base case projected loss and loss adjustment expense payments 
are produced by mUltiplying the held reserve levels by a reserve payout 
24The shocked reserves of year X equal the base case reserves of year X plus the 
impact of the shock on payments for next Y years. The choice of Y allows for a gradual 
recognition of the shock in the reserves. 
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pattern.25 These payout patterns are developed in a separate analysis 
and are in the annual statement Schedule P line detail. 26 
We describe one algorithm that can be used to produce loss pay-
ments given a targeted adverse loss development scenario. There is no 
one right way to do this, however. This method should be viewed as 
appropriate for a plain vanilla analysis where the primary objective is 
to mechanically vary loss payments, in both amount and timing, over a 
range of scenarios. The easiest way to describe the algorithm is with a 
few formulas. 
Let H represent the current held loss and loss adjustment expense 
reserve and Pi represent the base loss and loss adjustment expense 
payout in runoff year i, for i = 1,2, ... , n where n is the number of 
years needed to retire all current liabilities. Then 
n 
H=2:,h (1) 
i=l 
Next we let T be the targeted development scenario. (For example, if 
the scenario represents projected loss payments exceeding the held 
reserves by 10 percent, then T = 1.IH.) For each runoff year assume 
that the payments under the adverse scenario are related to the base 
scenario by a constant factor c raised to a power, where the power is 
the index of the runoff year, i.e., 
n 
T = 2:, PiC i • 
i=l 
(2) 
Equation (2) is just a polynomial of degree n in c and can be solved 
for the unknown c using standard numerical techniques such as the 
Newton-Raphson method; see, for example, Burden and Faires (1985, 
Chapter 2). Use of the exponential relationship lengthens the payout 
pattern relative to the base pattern, but this may be a reasonable way 
to model the adverse payments. (One could take the view there is rel-
atively more uncertainty associated with the projected payments far 
into the future than with the'projected payments in nearer years.) Most 
of the dollars of development ""ill occur early in the runoff27 because 
the volume of loss payments is much greater in these years than in the 
outer years. 
25There are some components of the held reserve that are excluded because no rea-
sonable base payout pattern can be developed, e.g., for asbestos reserves. 
26Schedule P is the analytical loss schedule-showing loss information by accident 
year-of the property/casualty annual statement. 
27This will tend to be true for all but the most extreme levels of targeted development. 
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At high levels of development and with long tailed lines of busi-
ness this method may put more development in the tail than is desired. 
To add more flexibility in controlling the timing of the additional loss 
payments we have modified the approach by dividing the polynomial 
into two sections. (Newton's method applies.) For earlier payments the 
same expression is used, with the increasing exponent, up to a spec-
ified year. After the specified year, say runoff year m, the exponent 
is kept constant (Le., PiCi is replaced with PiCm for i ~ m + 1). This 
allows us to maintain the original pattern or to vary the lengthening of 
the pattern anywhere between this (no change) and the full exponential 
approach. 
5 Other Liabilities 
5.1 Unearned Premium Reserve (UPR) 
The unearned premium reserve reflects a commitment to provide 
loss coverage for a limited period following the balance sheet date. In 
our analysis we reflect this future commitment by developing an ex-
pected combined ratio for the unexpired portion of currently in-force 
business. The product of this combined ratio and the UPR, less prepaid 
expenses, produces the total future outflows associated with the UPR. 
To obtain cash flows we apply a loss and loss adjustment expense pay-
out pattern to the total loss amount and assume that other expenses 
(excluding prepaid expense) are paid in the first runoff year. The loss 
and loss adjustment expense payout pattern for the UPR should reflect 
that the loss exposure is not even over the UPR coverage period, Le., the 
highest exposure is in the first quarter and exposure then decreases in 
each future quarter. This shortens the payout pattern relative to an 
accident year pattern. 
The method described requires the UPR to be an appropriate mea-
sure of the future loss exposure as of the balance sheet date. This 
may not be true, however, depending on how premiums are booked. 
For some of our commercial lines business premium is accounted on a 
booked-as-billed basis. The amount of written premium that is booked 
depends on the billing arrangement of the policy and does not neces-
sarily represent the full term premium of the policy. Likewise, the un-
earned premium reserve for the policy does not reflect the total future 
loss exposure on the policy.28 Therefore, when we project the future 
28For example, suppose a $120 annual policy is billed in four quarterly installments, 
and the premium is booked as billed. Then the booked written premium at the begin-
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outflows on the UPR we first adjust the UPR upward for these not yet 
booked or earned premiums. These premiums also represent future 
cash inflow. 
Finally, our model includes the capability to shock the future loss 
payments on the UPR according to the adverse (shocked) loss develop-
ment scenario selected. This is done by runoff year by taking the ratio 
of shocked to unshocked loss payments on the loss reserves and then 
applying this ratio to loss payments on the UPR. (We do this for all lines 
combined, not line by line.) 
5.2 Accrued Expense and Other Liabilities 
These liabilities include various accounts payable (including out-
standing general expenses), funds held on account of others, and vari-
ous accruals. For the insurance liabilities all we do is assume that the 
balance sheet amount is paid in the first runoff year. 
Insurance liabilities are highlighted because we perform our analy-
sis on two separate balance sheets. One balance sheet includes only the 
insurance liabilities and only those assets supporting those liabilities. 
(We maintain separate investment portfolios, one to support insurance 
liabilities and one to support statutory surplus.) The other balance 
sheet includes assets supporting surplus plus several corporate liabil-
ities such as accruals for postretirement benefits other than pensions 
(OPEBs, FAS 106) and corporate debt. We limit our discussion of OPEBs 
to an observation that they are of long duration. 
5.3 Taxes 
A detailed discussion of taxes is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Furthermore, in our analysis we have taken a broad brush approach to 
the tax question, and we feel this is reasonable in the context of the 
intended use of the analysis. 
In most of our past analyses we have ignored the effect of taxes. 
The purpose of our analysis is to see if we can withstand extreme shock 
scenarios, not to forecast future expectations. We always have assumed 
that these shocks would be so severe that federal income tax payments 
would be zero. 
We recently have included a rough tax calculation in our model in-
volving a calendar year taxable income base for each year of the runoff 
ning of each quarter is $30, and the associated unearned premium is $30. The balance 
sheet unearned premium reserve will not reflect the full loss exposure committed to 
under the policy. 
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and a calculation of the incurred tax payable. This requires tracking any 
net operating loss carryforwards available to the company; splitting in-
vestment income to taxable versus nontaxable components; tracking 
future investment income and losses from defaults; and tracking re-
serve runoffs, reserve strengthening, and the associated tax loss reserve 
discount factors. We have not reflected any alternative minimum tax in 
the tax flows. 
One significant question in modeling the timing of (ax flows is how 
to model the loss and loss adjustment expense reserve balances. Our 
loss development method produces higher loss payments in the runoff 
years which in total equal a selected target development. The question 
is to what extent do the loss reserves anticipate the future adverse loss 
payments at each runoff year end (Le., how is the reserve funded to 
meet the adverse loss payments)? Our approach has been to specify a 
certain horizon of future years adverse loss payments that the reserve 
responds to (for example, shocked year i reserve = unshocked year i 
reserve + shock payments for the next j years). The number of years in 
the horizon can vary, but we usually have assumed three to five years. 
6 Presentation Techniques 
Over the years presentation techniques for the results have varied. 
The intended message is always focused on the company's current abil-
ity to pay claims, however, and that only a cash flow analysis of this type 
can measure this ability. 
Furthermore, we always have focused first on this financial strength, 
using only those assets supporting our reserves. (We begin with assets 
equal to insurance liabilities - statutory basis, Le., no surplus included.) 
In this way we uncover our balance sheet financial strength, shOwing 
our ability to meet adversity without drawing on existing company sur-
plus. We believe that this makes the message even stronger. 
Getting the message across requires the use of various measures 
that quantify this financial strength. We have used amounts of nom-
inal net cash flow, cash flow net present value, and internal rate of 
return. These have been combined in various matrix formats to show 
the various combinations of interest rate, asset default, and reserve de-
velopment risks that have been evaluated. The simplest formats are 
those that are most consistently well received. 
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6.1 Nominal Net Cash Flows 
Presenting the nominal cash flows-asset inflows, liability outflows, 
net flow-is an effective way to communicate the financial strength 
available to meet company obligations. What this can show for balance 
sheet assets and liabilities is the amount by which expected asset cash 
flows exceed expected liability cash flows. This excess cash flow would 
be available to help manage the possibility of future adverse experience 
or, if this did not occur, would emerge as profit. Table 1 shows both 
the total amounts of the flows and the timing of the flows. Figures 1 
and 2 are based on the data in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Data 
Year Inflow Outflow Netflow 
1 3.70 4.00 -0.30 
2 1.70 2.50 -0.80 
3 1.50 1.40 0.10 
4 1.60 0.90 0.70 
5 1.60 0.80 0.80 
6 1.10 0.70 0.40 
7 1.00 0.70 0.30 
8 0.70 0.60 0.10 
9 0.60 0.40 0.20 
10 0.40 0.30 0.10 
11 0.30 0.20 0.10 
12 0.10 0.10 0.00 
13 0.08 0.07 0.01 
14 0.15 0.06 0.09 
15 0.10 0.05 0.05 
16 0.10 0.05 0.05 
17 0.09 0.05 0.04 
18 0.06 0.04 0.02 
19 0.06 0.04 0.02 
20 0.06 0.04 0.02 
Totals 15.00 13.00 2.00 
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Figure 1 
Runoff Cash Flow by Year 
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The graph of the net flow (inflow less outflow), depicted in Figure 
2, is also one that we have used frequently. It highlights the years 
with negative cash flows and the years with positive cash flows. These 
figures provide information that is easy to understand. In certain situa-
tions, however, they are handicapped by not providing a single number 
as an overall summary. 
6.2 Present Value 
Cash flow present values are also an important measure in our anal-
ysis. Present values have been used in two ways. 
• First, for our cash flow report we have included present values for 
many shock scenarios including the boundary scenarios (where 
the present value of the net cash flow equals zero). The report 
focuses on the range of answers and not the results of anyone 
scenario. 
• Second is the situation where we have needed to show financial 
strength in one or two slides or exhibits. Talking about many sce-
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narios distracts from the balance sheet financial strength. There-
fore, in this situation we have presented results for a single sce-
nario, our base case scenario. The net cash flow present value 
is easy to quote. A disadvantage to present value, however, is 
that the number can draw attention from the main message of 
financial strength. Questions to us have included: Is this a mar-
ket value? Is the discount rate before or after tax? What is the 
assumed borrowing versus reinvestment rate? etc., etc. 
The fundamental difficulty is choosing a discount rate for the present 
value calculation that everyone feels is appropriate. A possible solution 
is to present the answer as "the present value at x% is equal to y" and 
be ready with several other answers at different discount rates. 
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6.3 Internal Rate of Return 
Like the present value, the internal rate of return ORR) is easy to 
quote. In addition, the IRR avoids the argument over what discount 
rate to use, and it communicates well to investment persons. 
The IRR is not easily understood by non-investment persons, and it 
provides less information than nominal flows. One misinterpretation is 
that the IRR is the highest rate that the asset cash flows can withstand 
and still be sufficient to meet the liability cash flows. This is true only 
for constant interest rate scenarios. Finally, the IRR does have some 
limitations, e.g., sometimes the IRR is not a unique positive number. 
In our cash flow report we use the IRR to provide the border interest 
rate (Le., the interest rate where the present value of the net cash flows 
equals zero for a given combination of asset default and reserve devel-
opment assumptions). We generally focus on the year to year changes 
in the IRR. If the IRR changes Significantly, this usually is a signal to do 
more work to understand why the change occurred (sometimes uncov-
ering problems with the data). 
Generally we limit IRR use to our own analytical purposes and to 
situations where the intended audience is familiar with it. 
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Appendix 
This appendix demonstrates an application of Altman's (1989) method 
to Schedule D - Part lA data. 
1. From Schedule D, Part lA, schedule the amount of bond principal 
still outstanding by year, by rating. For example, class 1 bonds 
outstanding in year 5 include bonds maturing in years six through 
ten, ten through 20, and over 20 years.29 Government bonds are 
pulled as if they were a separate rating group, as we assume they 
have a ° percent default rate. 
2. The annual statement shows bonds by NAIC classes 1 through 6. 
Default rates come in rating groups AAA through B. This requires 
a translation of the above data by NAIC class into default table 
rating groups. 
Classes 2 through 4 translate directly into specific ratings (BBB, 
BB, and B). Class 1, containing AAA though A, was translated into 
a rating of AA.30 Classes 5 and 6 were grouped with those rated B. 
(This may distort the final answer for a company with significant 
class 5 and 6 bonds due to the high default rates for these bonds, 
although this is minimized due to NAIC rules restricting these 
investments.)31 
3. Translate the cumulative default probabilities from the default 
table into incremental default probabilities. 
4. Apply these incremental default probabilities by rating and lag 
year against outstanding bonds by rating and default year to get 
default rates by year. 
29Schedule D, Part lA includes bonds by broad maturity ranges: 1 or less, 2-5, 6-10, 
11-20, over 20. We translate these ranges into maturity years of 1, 3, 7, 15, and 25. 
Only the first 20 years were used, however, as default rates are not published beyond 
20 lag years. 
30This has minimal impact, as default rates in the tables vary little between A, AA, 
and AM ratings. 
31 An additional problem exists in that bonds below class 2 (rating BBB, which is 
the lowest rating for investment grade bonds) are carried at market in the prop-
erty/casualty annual statement. Therefore Schedule D, Part lA would tend to under-
estimate the level of lower rated bonds in the predefault bond cash flows. This bias 
would be hidden where coupon rates are above current yields and exacerbated when 
coupon rates are below current yields. 
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Numerical Example of Default Rate Calculation 
Steps 1 & 2-Schedule amount of bond principal outstanding, by year, 
by rating. See Tables 1 and 2. 
Class 
1 
Table 1 
Excerpt From Schedule D, Part lA * 
Quality and Maturity Distribution of Bonds 
Range of Maturities in Years 
< 1 Year 1-5 5-10 10-20 > 20 
27,034 56,306 77,989 80,790 32,173 
*Using 1994 Best's Aggregates & Averages 
Table 2 
Total 
274,291 
Assumed Outstanding Principal of Bonds by Rating Group 
Year Rating 
1 2 3 4 Class 
Gov't 138,954 122,347 122,347 66,418 
AAA 
AA 274,291 247,258 247,258 190,952 1 
A 
BBB 27,864 24,906 24,906 18,090 2 
BB 3,455 3,246 3,246 2,460 3 
B or Lower 2,701 2,539 2,539 1,974 4-6 
Total 446,905 400,296 400,296 279,894 
Notes: Class 1 bonds are assumed to be AA. Year 1 outstanding (O/S) is total 
principal for the class; Beginning year 2 O/S = year 1 O/S, minus year 1 maturities; 
Beginning year 4 O/S = year 3 O/S, minus 1-5 year maturities (assuming principal 
matures at the midpoints of the intervals, e.g., 3.5 years for the 1-5 year maturities); 
etc. 
Step 3-Translate cumulative default probabilities to incremental de-
fault probabilities, e.g., cumulative AA default rate at three and four 
years equals 0.001 and 0.002 respectively;32 therefore, incremental de-
32A table of cumulative default rates is published annually by Moody's Investors 
Service. To get the incremental rates from the cumulative default table, one must take 
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fault rate for year 4 is (0.002 - 0.001)/0 - 0.001) = 0.001. These 
incremental default probabilities are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Incremental Default Assumptions (Moody's, 1994) 
Year 
1 2 3 4 
AAA 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
AA 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
A 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 
BBB 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 
BB 1.8% 2.6% 2.6% 2.7% 
B or Lower 8.3% 7.1% 6.6% 5.5% 
Step 4-Weight incremental default rates by rating and lag year against 
outstanding bond principal by rating and lag year to get average default 
rates by year: 
Table 4 
Average Default Rates 
Year 
1 2 3 4 
All Rating Groups 0.08% 0.09% 0.15% 0.17% 
the conditional probability of default in year 11, given that default does not occur before 
year n. If'C(n) is the cumulative default rate through year n, then the incremental 
default rate is [C(n) - C(n -1)]/[1 - C(n - 1)]. 
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A Pension Plan Incorporating Both Defined Benefit 
and Defined Contribution Principles 
M. Zaki Khorasanee* 
Abstract t 
We propose a defined contribution pension plan with an explicitly defined 
benefit formula. Such a plan is expected to pay more stable and predictable 
benefits over time than one based on the money purchase principle. The prop-
erties of the plan are investigated through simulation. Methods for distributing 
surpluses and eliminating deficiencies that involve adjusting the rate of ben-
efit accrual (rather than varying the rate of contribution) are discussed. The 
behavior of the plan under a scenario of persistently unfavorable investment 
experience is Simulated, and methods for satisfactorily dealing with such a sce-
nario are considered. The plan actuary is expected to play an important role 
in maintaining an appropriate balance between solvency and stability. 
Key words and phrases: money purchase plan, Simulation, equity index, invest-
ment 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Defined Contribution Plans 
Defined contribution pension plans 1 are growing in popularity in 
the United Kingdom (U.K.). In countries such as the U.S.A. and Australia 
*M. Zaki Khorasanee, B.A., F.I.A., is a lecturer in the Department of Actuarial Science 
and Statistics at City University, England. He obtained his B.A. degree in 1985 from 
Cambridge University and has worked for six years as a pension actuary with various 
consulting firms in, the London area. 
Mr. Khorasanee's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, City 
University, Northampton Square, London ECl V OHB, England. Internet address: 
m.z.khorasanee@city.ac.uk 
tThe author would like to acknowledge the help of his colleague Professor Steven 
Haberman whose comments on earlier drafts of this paper have improved both the 
presentation and content of the final version. 
1 A pension plan (U.S.A. and Canada) is termed a pension scheme in the U.K. 
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such plans are being established by employers of all sizes. The principal 
advantages to the sponsoring employer of a defined contribution plan, 
compared with a defined benefit plan, are: 
• Stable contributions, normally a fixed percentage of the pension-
able payroll; 
• No risk of insolvency, thus no possibility that the plan can repre-
sent a liability for the employer; 
• Freedom from compliance with legislation aimed at defined ben-
efit plans. 
The risks associated with poor investment performance are trans-
ferred to employees, who no longer can rely on their employers to pay 
additional contributions in order to support a fixed benefit scale. Thus, 
a report commissioned by the U.K. government (1993) recommends 
that active members of defined contribution plans should appoint at 
least two-thirds of the trustees. Although this proportion was reduced 
to one third in subsequent legislation, the logic of allowing members 
to assume responsibility for the assets of a defined contribution plan 
seems inescapable, as members are the ones who will bear the adverse 
consequences of any mismanagement of assets. 
1.2 Money Purchase Approach 
Will a rational group of employees want its defined contribution plan 
to run on the money purchase principle?2 Although this is the approach 
normally taken, it involves a considerable degree of investment risk for 
individual members, given that: 
• Equities generally are accepted as the most suitable asset class for 
long-term savings because they are believed to be a hedge against 
inflation and because they are expected to provide superior re-
turns to other assets; and 
• The return from equities has been, and probably will continue 
to be, highly variable, so the fund accumulated by an individual 
member will depend greatly on whether his or her period of mem-
bership happens to coincide with a period of favorable or unfa-
vorable investment experience. 
2In most defined contribution plans each member's accumulation of benefit is di-
rectly linked to the return on the assets of the fund over the same member's period of 
service. This is sometimes called the money purchase principle. 
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A comparison by Bodie (1989) based on historic U.K. investment and 
earnings data for a money purchase plan in which contributions of 10 
percent of earnings were invested in ordinary shares shows that the 
pension of an employee with 20 years of service retiring in one of the 
years from 1970 to 1987 would have varied between 13 percent and 41 
percent of final salary. 
1.3 Defined Benefit Approach 
Most defined benefit plans provide benefits based on employee re-
muneration. This satisfies the salutary objective of providing the pen-
sioner an income commensurate ·with that received while working. 
The most common benefit formula grants a fixed fraction of final 
salary for each year of service with the sponsoring employer. This for-
mula directly links income received immediately before and after re-
tirement; however, anomalies can arise if employees are subject to un-
usually large changes in salary close to retirement. Some pension plans 
have dealt with this problem by adopting a benefit formula based on 
career average salary, where each salary figure is increased on an index 
of wage or price inflation over the period to retirement. 
One of the most important features of these plans compared with 
money purchase plans is the reduction in benefit uncertainty for indi-
vidual members, especially if benefits are measured in real rather than 
in nominal terms. Real salary increases are much less variable than 
are real investment returns. This reduction in benefit uncertainty is 
possible because of two characteristics of defined benefit plans: 
• The sponsoring employer varies the rate of contribution in accor-
dance with the financial position of the fund; 
• Surpluses and deficits arising from investment volatility are tol-
erated, effectively smoothing volatile investment returns between 
different generations of employees. 
Although the first characteristic cannot, by definition, be part of a de-
fined contribution plan, there is no reason why the second characteris-
tic should not be. Thus, some defined contribution plans operate with 
an investment reserve, in order to smooth out variability in benefits 
for retiring members. The objective of this paper is to examine one 
possible way of running such a plan, in which elements of the defined 
benefit approach are adopted. 
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1.4 Integrating Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution 
Approaches 
We examine the possibility of operating an integrated plan, i.e., a 
defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale. In this case 
the defined benefit scale is linked to career average revalued salary. 
Such a benefit scale represents the ultimate smoothing of investment 
returns. Carr (1988) observes that a defined benefit scale based on 
career average revalued salary is similar to a money purchase plan in 
which each member's fund accumulates at the same real rate of interest. 
This integrated plan deviates from the pure defined benefit approach 
in one important respect: the rate of benefit accrual will vary, its value 
depending on the current surplus/deficit of fund assets over accrued 
liabilities. Thus, the response to a deficit is to reduce the accrual rate 
for future service (rather than to increase the contribution rate as in a 
pure defined benefit plan). Moderate surpluses can be tolerated as a 
safety margin against future adverse experience; an excessive surplus 
is handled through a fixed percentage increase in the accrued benefits 
of existing members. 
To my knowledge, no integrated pension plan based on the princi-
ples described above exists. As such, this paper examines the feasibility 
of the proposed plan solely from an actuarial viewpoint. Only when the 
merits and demerits of the plan on actuarial grounds have been consid-
ered would it be appropriate to consider legislative concerns. 
2 The Model Pension Plan 
2.1 Main Characteristics 
Our model integrated plan has the follOwing properties: 
• A single member at each age from 25 to 64 inclusive; 
• The same fixed pensionable salary for each member; 
• An employer contribution for each member of one unit3 per an-
num, paid annually in advance; 
• No employee contributions; 
• No mortality before age 65; 
3We use currency units adjusted for wage inflation. It follows that the fixed contri-
bution per member is effectively a fixed proportion of salary. 
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• All members who leave service before retirement are replaced by 
new entrants of identical age and salary; 
• All retirements occur at age 65; 
• Each active member retiring at age 65 is replaced by a new entrant 
age 25. 
In addition, the following notation is used throughout the paper: 
S(x, t) 
B(x, t) 
rna 
a(t) 
bt 
B(t) 
AL(t) 
SF(t) 
SR(t) 
FR(t) 
F(t) 
D(t) 
AVRF 
Annual pensionable salary over next year of 
a member age x at time t; 
Accrued lump sum benefit, payable at age 65, 
of a member age x at time t; 
Target fraction of career average earnings per year of 
pensionable service; 
Additional benefit awarded to each member for each unit 
of benefit accrued at time t; 
Fraction of target accrual rate applied during [t, t + 1); 
Benefit outgo of plan at time t; 
Value of accrued liabilities at time t; 
Entry age normal standard fund at time t; 
Solvency ratio at time t; 
Funding ratio at time t; 
Market value of fund at time t; 
Equity index dividend yield at time t; 
Average return on fund over all t; 
Actuarial return on the assets during [t, t + 1); 
Return on market value of assets during [t, t + 1); 
Return on equity index during [t, t + 1); 
Interest rate assumed by actuary; and 
1/(1 + 0. 
2.2 Benefit at Retirement 
We assume that a lump sum benefit, equal to some fraction of ca-
reer average salary for each year of pensionable service, is paid on re-
tirement. The lump sum retirement benefit accrues in the following 
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way: 
B(x + I, t + 1) = (1 + a(t)B(x, t) + mobts(x, t). (1) 
Equation (1) defines the principle on which our proposed plan is 
based. It is a career average salary plan with a fixed target rate of 
accrual, but the parameters a(t) and b t can be used to vary both the 
benefits accrued from past senice and the future rate of accrual in a 
manner appropriate to the financial position of the plan at time t. The 
plan can be described as a variable defined benefit plan. 
Under ideal conditions a(t) is always equal to zero and bt is always 
equal to one; equation (1) then simplifies to: 
B(x + I, t + 1) = B(x, t) + mos(x, t), 
which represents a pure defined benefit plan in which all members re-
ceive the same fraction of career average salary for each year of pen-
sionable service. In practice, both a(t) and bt would need to be varied 
from time to time to accommodate the variable investment experience 
of the plan. 
In our model plan each member has the same fixed pensionable 
salary, so we can write: 
We now define: 
Bo 
n(x, t) 
s(x, t) = so. 
40moso 
B(x, t)/(moso). 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Bo is the target benefit of a member retiring with 40 years service, 
and n(x, t) is the effective pensionable service of the member age x at 
time t. It follows from equations (1) to (4) that: 
n(x + I, t + 1) 
B(x,t) 
(1 + a(t)n(x,t) + bt 
Bo 
40 n(x, t). 
(5) 
(6) 
Equations (5) and (6) will be used to project the liabilities of our plan. 
2.3 Benefit on Withdrawal 
Members who leave service before retirement would receive a de-
ferred lump sum, payable at age 65, based on the accrued benefit at 
the time employment ends. Although such individuals would not ac-
crue benefits after leaving, it may be reasonable for them to continue 
Khorasanee: Pension Plan 275 
to share in any future distributions of surplus before they retire. Thus, 
equations (5) and (6), Vl1th bt set to zero, would continue to apply for 
deferred pensioners. 
As this withdrawal benefit is revalued in line with wage inflation 
between the date of leaving and retirement, it is no different from the 
benefit that would have accrued for the same period of service had the 
member stayed in the plan until age 65. As we have assumed that all 
those who leave early are replaced by new entrants of the same age 
and salary, it follows that withdrawals before retirement have no effect 
on the plan. The total benefits paid to those who leave early and their 
replacements would be the same as those received by a single member 
who stays in the plan until retirement. 
2.4 Discontinuance Benefits 
If the plan is wound up, there would be no obligation for the em-
ployer to cover any shortfall in the assets relative to the accrued liabil-
ities, and it is unlikely that buying out liabilities linked to future wage 
inflation would be an option. The logical course of action is to pay each 
member an immediate transfer value, dividing the assets of the fund in 
proportion to the value of each member's accrued benefits. Hence, the 
amount of each transfer value would be given by: 
Transfer Value = Solvency Ratio x B(x, t)V65 - X (7) 
where v is the annual discount factor based on the assumed valuation 
interest rate, and the solvency ratio is the market value of the assets 
divided by the total value of the accrued benefits. 
Although the question of solvency cover is not a problem for the 
employer, it is of considerable importance to members, who run the 
risk of having their benefits scaled back if the plan is wound up. 
2.5 Investment Strategy 
In Pension Fund Indicators '96, the U.K.-based fund manager PDFM4 
quotes a figure of 77 percent of total U.K. pension fund assets being 
invested in equities at the end of 1995. This figure is an average-one 
would expect the equity content of any particular fund to depend of 
the mean term of its liabilities and the proportion of its liabilities that 
are real rather than nominal. Thus, as a general rule, the smaller the 
4philips & Drew Fund Management Limited (PDFM), 10 Broadgate, Liverpool Street, 
London EC2M 2RH, United Kingdom. 
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number of pensioners in a pension plan, the greater the asset allocation 
to equities. 
Given that there are no pensioner liabilities in our proposed plan 
and all the deferred pensioner liabilities are indexed in line with wages, 
we assume the fund is 100 percent invested in U.K. equities. It can be 
argued that part of the fund should be invested in government stocks 
to reduce volatility in returns. Such a reduction in volatility could be 
at the expense of lower average returns and, therefore, lower average 
benefits. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether a defined con-
tribution plan can reduce the variability in the benefit payout without 
reducing either the average benefit payout or volatility in investment 
returns. 
3 Formulae for Simulations 
3.1 Actuarial Valuation 
There is no question that the model plan we have described would 
require periodic actuarial valuations, as does any defined benefit plan. 
The purpose of such valuations would be to: 
• Determine the ratio of the assets of the plan to both the value 
of the accrued benefits and to the standard fund of our chosen 
funding method; and 
• Recommend, if judged appropriate, a distribution of surplus or a 
change in the rate of benefit accrual. 
Two interesting questions not considered are whether the solvency of 
the plan should require legal certification and whether the trustees 
should have the right to refuse the actuary's advice. We assume here 
that the plan is run in accordance v.ith the actuary's recommendations. 
3.2 Standard FundS 
Should the standard fund for our integrated plan simply be the value 
of the accrued benefits? As the accrued benefits are indexed in line with 
earnings, such a standard fund would be consistent with the projected 
SThe term standard fund is the U.K. terminology for the target level of assets for any 
particular funding method. 
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unit credit method, a commonly used funding method for large defined 
benefit plans. 
The projected unit credit method is not prudent for our plan, how-
ever, because it requires an increasing rate of contribution for an ag-
ing membership. Because our plan is a defined contribution plan, a 
projected unit credit standard fund would have insufficient assets to 
meet the projected benefits of the existing members should the plan 
be closed to new entrants. 
The standard fund of the entry age normal method is appropriate 
for our plan because: 
• It would have sufficient assets to meet the projected benefits if 
the plan were closed to new entrants; and 
• No strain arises if new entrants above the selected entry age are 
matched by withdrawing members of the same age and salary. 
The second characteristic arises because a withdrawing member pro-
duces a release of reserve under the entry age normal method that 
matches the strain created by a new entrant of the same age and salary. 
As we have assumed that new entrants and withdrawals are matched 
in this way, they can safely be ignored in our simulations. In practice 
we may have a growing plan in which there are excess new entrants 
entering at ages above the assumed entry age (age 25 for our plan). 
This problem could be resolved by requiring such individuals to serve 
a nonpensionable waiting period, during which time the employer con-
tributions paid on their behalf would offset the strain on the fund. 
3.3 Derivation of Formulae 
We assume that all benefit payments from and contributions to the 
plan are made at annual intervals coinciding with the date of retirement 
of the oldest member. The target benefit, Bo, is set by the actuary: 
Bo = 5401 at rate i. (8) 
The benefit outgo in any year is the lump sum paid to the retiring mem-
ber, hence: 
Bo B(t) = B(65, t) = 40 n(65, t). 
The accrued liabilities and standard fund are given by: 
64 B _ 
= 2: ~n(x, t)v 6 :>-x 
X=25 40 
AL(t) (9) 
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64 
SF(t) = L (:~[n(X,t)+65-X]V65-X-a65_XI)' (10) 
x=25 
The market value of the fund is given by the recurrence formula: 
F(t + 1) = (F(t) + 40)(1 + jd - B(t + 1). (ll) 
3.4 Solvency and Funding Ratios 
The solvency ratio is a measure of the capacity of the pension plan's 
assets to cover its accrued liabilities on an immediate wind-up of the 
plan, thus: 
SR(t) = F(t)/AL(t). 
Clearly, large values of SR(t) are desirable. 
The funding ratio, on the' other hand, concerns the extent to which 
the standard fund is covered by assets. In actuarial valuations of U.K. 
defined benefit plans it is customary to use a discounted cash flow 
value for the assets rather than their market value, because this tends 
to smooth market fluctuations. This is a highly desirable objective for 
our plan, as the actuary would wish to avoid recommending benefit 
changes as a result of short-term movements in the equity market. 
Accordingly, we define Fa (t) to be the actuarial value of fund at 
time t; and do to be the par dividend yield. As the fund is 100 percent 
invested in U.K. equities, its actuarial value is: 
Fa(t) D(t)F(t) / do (12) 
and 
FR(t) Fa (t) / SR(t). (13) 
3.5 Money Purchase Plan 
We compare the benefit outgo of our plan with that of a money pur-
chase plan subject to the same investment experience. For the money 
purchase plan, we define f m (x, t) to be the fund accumulated by mem-
ber age x at time t and Bm (t) to be the benefit outgo at time t of the 
money purchase plan. If follows that: 
f m (x + 1, t + 1) 
Bm(t) 
(l + fm(x, t))(l + jd 
fm (65, t). 
(14) 
(15) 
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4 Deterministic Simulations Using Investment and 
Earnings Data 
In this section we simulate the progress of our plan using U.K. equity 
returns and wage inflation from 1950 to 1994. Equity returns prior to 
1963 are taken from the BZW Equity Index6 and thenceforth from the 
FT-SE-A All-Share Index. 7 Wage inflation is based on the annual increase 
in the most representative index of U.K. average earnings available at 
the time, as published by the Government Statistical Service (1993). 
4.1 Initial Assumptions 
The target benefit offered by the plan depends on the assumption 
used by the plan actuary for equity returns net of pay increases. The 
average net return on the U.K. equity index, using actuarial values, is 
roughly 4 percent per annum from 1950 to 1994. 
We assume that: 
• The actuary sets net interest at 3 percent per annum; and 
• Each member initially has pensionable service n(x, 0) = x - 25. 
Thus, from equations (8), (9), and (10) we can determine that Bo = 77.7 
units, AL(O) = 1048 units, and SF(O) = 1215 units. 
The equity index dividend yield at the start of 1950 was 5 percent, 
which is roughly equal to the average figure from 1950 to 1994. We 
therefore assume the par dividend yield to be 5 percent, in which case 
the market value of the assets initially will be the same as the actuarial 
value. We also assume the plan starts with a funding ratio of 100 per-
cent, thus: F(O) = 1215 units, FR(O) = 100 percent, and SR(O) = 116 
percent. 
For comparison with a money purchase plan, we assume that: 
• The money purchase plan starts with the same assets as our plan 
and follows the same investment strategy; 
• Each member's initial fund is equal to the entry age normal reserve 
at 3 percent interest. 
6The BZW equity index is a representath'e stock price index for ordinary shares 
traded in the United Kingdom. This index is compiled by the investment bank BarcJays 
de Zoete Wedd (hence BZW). 
7The FT-SE-A All-Share index is the most representative U.K. stock price index since 
1963. It is published by the London Financial Times and is jointly compiled by the 
London Stock Exchange and the Institute of Actuaries. 
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4.2 Fixed Defined Benefit Scale 
We first examine what would happen to the plan if it maintained a 
fixed benefit outgo regardless of its investment experience (as for a true 
defined benefit plan), i.e., a(t) = 0 and bt = 1 for t ~ O. We examine 
three different scenarios: 
• Case A: jt = et and AVRF= i + 0.01; 
• Case B: jt = et - 0.01 and A VRF = i; and 
• Case C: jt = et - 0.02 and AvRF = i - 0.01. 
The simulated solvency and funding ratios of the plan are shown in 
Figure 1. Part (a) of Figure 1 shows the effect of the average investment 
return exceeding the actuary's initial assumption by approximately 1 
percent per annum over the 45 year period. The funding surplus re-
mains within reasonable bounds until the early 1980s, at which point it 
rises rapidly (from 32 percent of the standard fund in 1982 to 174 per-
cent of the standard fund in 1995). The solvency ratio, derived from the 
market value of the assets, is more volatile (falling to 49 percent after 
the stock market crash of 1974-1975). The favorable investment expe-
rience of the 1980s and 1990s results in the solvency cover exceeding 
400 percent in 1994. 
Part (b) of Figure 1 shows how the plan behaves when the investment 
experience is roughly consistent with the initial 3 percent assumption; 
thus, the funding surplus after 45 years is only 22 percent of the stan-
dard fund. The solvency ratio is below 100 percent over the eight year 
period from 1975 to 1983, but ends at 176 percent. 
Part (c) of Figure 1 shows the effect of investment returns averaging 
only 2 percent per annum, 1 percent below the actuary's assumption. 
The funding and solvency ratios stay within reasonable bounds until the 
early 1970s, when the plan goes heavily into deficit and never recovers. 
It is only the favorable investment experience of the 1980s and 1990s 
that prevents the fund from running out of assets altogether. 
These simulations show that a defined contribution plan cannot in-
definitely operate with a fixed defined benefit scale unless the actuary 
can predict average investment returns with considerable accuracy. The 
past experience has shown us a difference of 1 percent per annum be-
tween assumed and actual investment returns results in an untenable 
position within 40 years. As no actuary can be confident of predicting 
the average return to the required degree of accuracy, a variable benefit 
scale responding to changes in the funding and solvency positions is 
necessary. 
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Figure 1 
Fixed Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios 
Part (a): actual return = assumed return + 1 % 
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4.3 Variable Defined Benefit Scale 
Our variable defined benefit scale involves assigning values to aCt) 
other than zero and values to bt other than one. Davies (1991) com-
ments that a function of surplus in defined benefit plans is to act as 
a margin against future unfayorable experience. This criterion is even 
more valid for a defined contribution plan attempting to follow a de-
fined benefit scale, as the employer has no obligation to support the 
benefit scale with additional contributions. Thus, a fairly large fund-
ing surplus is desirable as a margin; perhaps only surpluses above this 
funding margin should be distributed. We arbitrarily select a funding 
margin of 50 percent of the standard fund, thus: 
FR(t) 
aCt) = max { 1.5 - 1, O}. (16) 
A solvency ratio of less than 100 percent is a matter for serious con-
cern, particularly as the required fund for solvency purposes would be 
significantly lower than the standard fund. It seems likely that most of 
the members would agree to a temporary suspension of benefit accrual 
in order to restore the plan to financial health. Thus, the suggested 
formula for bt is: 
{
I if SR(t) ~ 100% 
b t = 0 if SR(t) < 100%. (17) 
The progress of the plan is simulated for the three investment sce-
narios. Figure 2 shows the values of aCt) and bt from 1950 to 1994; 
Figure 3 shows the solvency and funding ratios; and Figure 4 compares 
the benefit outgo of the variable defined benefit plan with that of a 
money purchase plan subject to the same funding and investment ex-
perience. 
As expected, the favorable investment scenario, Case A, results in 
the largest and most frequent distributions of surplus (when aCt) > 0), 
while benefit accrual is suspended only during the crash of 1974-1975 
(when b t = 0). Under the unfavorable investment scenario, Case C, 
there is no distribution of surplus (a(t) is always zero), and benefit 
accrual is suspended for 13 consecutive years from 1972 to 1984. 
Figure 3 shows that in all three scenarios the solvency and funding 
ratios follow a remarkably similar pattern. In each case a healthy, but 
reasonable, funding surplus emerges after 45 years, and the solvency 
ratio ends at approximately 200 percent. 
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Figure 2 
Variable Defined Benefits: a(t) and bt 
Part (a): actual return = assumed return + 1 % 
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Figure 3 
Variable Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios 
Part (a): actual return = assumed return + 1 % 
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Comparison of Benefit Outflows 
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Figure 4 is the most important one for judging whether the variable 
defined benefit plan has any advantages over a money purchase plan. 
Figure 4 shows that our proposed plan provides more stable benefits 
over time. In each case the variable defined benefit outgo is a trend 
line through the money purchase outgo, and sharp variations in benefit 
payments from year to year are avoided. 
5 Stochastic Simulations 
The deterministic simulations of the previous section show us how 
the variable defined benefit plan behaves when equity returns follow a 
similar pattern to those experienced from 1950 to 1994. The benefit 
outgo of our plan is more stable from year to year than that of a money 
purchase plan. 
We have yet to establish whether the projected retirement fund of 
an active member of our plan is less variable than in a money purchase 
plan. This question can only be answered adequately through simula-
tions using a stochastic model for equity returns net of wage inflation. 
5.1 Stochastic Model for Equity Returns 
Recall that rt is the actuarial return on the assets: 
(1 + idD(t + 1) - D(t) 
rt = D(t) . (18) 
Let us assume that the actuarial returns form a" sequence of indepen-
dent, identically-distributed, log-normal random variables. Historical 
annual data from 1950 to 1994 yield the estimate for the standard de~ 
viation ofln[1 + rtl as 0.0675. 
Next we consider how to model the equity dividend yield time series. 
Wilkie (1986) observes that the average dividend yield on U.K. equities 
has tended to vary about a long-term average and that yields in adja-
cent periods exhibit significant positive correlation. This implies that 
the U.K. equity market has tended to correct itself when overvalued or 
undervalued by historic standards, which has important implications 
for the variability in funds accumulated over long periods. 
Wilkie uses a first order autoregressive formula for the logarithm 
of the equity dividend yield and assumes that past price inflation had 
a direct effect on yields. Because we require a model that operates in 
real values, we ignore the latter feature of Wilkie's model and use the 
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following formula: 
In[D(t)] = (1 - k)J.1d + kln[D(t)] + (J"dNt.Jl - k 2 (19) 
where Nt is the standard normal random variable with mean zero and 
unit variance, and k, J.1d, and (J"d are parametric constants. The following 
estimates for the parameters are obtained from historic data from 1950 
to 1994: k = 0.5, J.1d = -3.0, and (J"d = 0.24. 
5.2 Initial Assumptions 
One thousand independent simulations are performed for both the 
variable defined benefit plan and the money purchase plan, so that 
values for the projected retirement fund of members at different initial 
ages are obtained for both types of plan. 
The initial assumptions are as above: Bo is based on a net interest 
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x,O) = x - 25; a(t) and b t 
are determined as in equations (16) and (17); and j(x, 0) = entry age 
normal reserve at 3 percent net interest. For the stochastic investment 
model, we assume additionally that D(O) = 5 percent and the mean of 
In[1 + rtJ is In(l.03). 
5.3 Dependence of Results on Initial Conditions 
A problem with simulations for the variable defined benefit plan 
is that the expected fund at retirement (and also, to some degree, its 
variability) depends on the initial funding and solvency ratios. 
We start with a funding ratio of 100 percent. Given the methods 
used for determining a(t) and b t , however, the expected funding ratio 
at any future time is likely to be greater than 100 percent. In the money 
purchase plan there is no similar tendency to build surplus assets. It 
follows that for these particular simulations the mean benefit obtained 
at retirement will be lower for the variable defined benefit plan than 
for the money purchase plan. This will not be true in general, however, 
because for future new entrants to the variable defined benefit plan the 
funding ratio is as likely to rise as to fall over their period of service. 
Also, in the variable defined benefit plan it seems likely that the 
variability of the benefit paid at retirement will depend on the size of 
the initial fund. Perhaps this variability would be greatest if the initial 
funding position of the plan were either very strong or very weak, as 
either a(t) or b t then would be more likely to deviate from its usual 
value. 
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In spite of the problems outlined above, we should still obtain some 
useful information from these simulations, particularly in relation to 
how the variability in the projected retirement benefit reduces as the 
member gets closer to retirement, which we term the narrowing funnel 
of doubt. 
5.4 Results of Stochastic Simulations 
Percentiles for the projected retirement benefit are obtained for both 
the variable defined benefit and money purchase plans for members ini-
tiallyage 25, 45, and 55 and are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
For each initial age the money purchase plan pays a higher median bene-
fit. This occurs because we chose an initial funding ratio of 100 percent 
for the variable defined benefit plan. There is no reason to believe that 
in the long term the median benefit paid by the two types of plan would 
differ significantly. To compare the variability of the projected benefit 
in each type of plan, we tabulate the ratio of the benefit at the 75th 
percentile to that at the 25th percentile; see Table 3. 
Table 1 
Percentiles for Variable Defined Benefit Plan 
Initial Percentile 
Age 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
25 46.6 60.2 71.8 92.0 142.2 
45 58.3 66.0 71.8 77.7 102.2 
55 66.0 69.9 73.8 75.7 78.0 
Table 2 
Percentiles for Money Purchase Plan 
Initial Percentile 
Age 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
25 43.8 62.3 79.8 104.7 151.7 
45 47.0 63.7 80.6 101.5 141.7 
55 47.8 63.4 76.7 95.6 129.9 
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Table 3 
Interquartile Ratio 
Initial Variable Money 
Age Defined Benefit Purchase 
25 1.53 1.68 
45 1.18 1.59 
55 1.08 1.51 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the projected benefit at retirement from the 
variable defined benefit plan is at all ages less variable than that from 
the money purchase plan. The difference in variability is not that great 
at age 25, but becomes more significant as the member nears retire-
ment. Thus, the funnel of doubt narrows more quickly in the variable 
defined benefit plan. Members of the variable defined benefit plan will 
have less need to switch their fund to low risk assets on approaching 
retirement, as normally would be recommended in a money purchase 
arrangement. 
The narrowing funnel of doubt also means that a member of the 
variable defined benefit plan will have more advance warning of a sub-
standard benefit at retirement. We can see how this could occur: a 
member who had experienced a period of nil accrual or was currently 
serving in such a period would have a reduced benefit expectation. The 
advantage of such foresight is that it gives the member an incentive to 
make additional provision for retirement. 
5.5 Effect of a Lower Funding Margin 
We have somewhat arbitrarily assumed that our variable defined 
benefit plan would operate with a funding margin of 50 percent, so 
that only surpluses in excess of this margin would be distributed. In 
practice a margin of this size may not be permitted by legislation. We 
now examine the consequences of using a lower funding margin to de-
termine whether the variable defined benefit plan can operate as effec-
tively under such a regime. 
Using the same stochastic model for equity returns, 1000 simula-
tions are made for the variable defined benefit plan assuming that all 
surpluses in excess of a funding ratio of 125 percent are distributed 
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immediately. All other initial assumptions are as before. The results of 
the simulations are shown in Table 4. 
In Table 5 we tabulate the interquartile ratios, comparing the results 
with those obtained for the variable defined benefit plan using a 50 
percent funding margin. The increase in variability caused by reducing 
the funding margin to 25 percent is not particularly large. The possible 
effect on the results of using an initial funding ratio of 100 percent, 
however, should be borne in mind. 
Table 4 
Percentiles for a 25 Percent Funding Margin 
Initial 
Age 
25 
45 
55 
5th 
46.6 
56.7 
66.0 
Initial 
Age 
25 
45 
55 
6 Ruin Scenarios 
Percentile 
25th 50th 75th 
60.5 73.7 93.7 
67.2 74.3 87.5 
71.8 74.1 78.2 
Table 5 
Interquartile Ratio 
Funding Margin 
95th 
130.2 
116.2 
92.5 
50 Percent 25 Percent 
1.53 
1.18 
1.08 
1.55 
1.30 
1.09 
6.1 Effect of Poor Investment Experience 
Thus far we have shown that our plan could cope with investment 
returns 1 percent lower than assumed by the actuary. Part (c) of Figure 
3 shows that the plan ends with a comfortable funding surplus after 45 
years, at the price of having to suspend accrual of benefits from 1972 
to 1984. (See Part (c) of Figure 2.) 
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We now turn our attention to more extreme situations, in which 
even the suspension of accrual is not sufficient to restore the plan to 
solvency. Our plan cannot, by definition, be insolvent following a wind-
up because the benefits payable in such an event are shares of the re-
maining fund. It is theoretically possible, however, that the plan could 
exhaust its assets while still in operation, resulting in insufficient cash 
flow to pay the benefits promised to retiring members. There are two 
factors that might lead to such a situation: 
• Extremely and persistently poor investment returns; 
• Moderately poor investment returns combined with a declining 
number of active members. 
A declining number of active members would lead to declining contri-
bution income from the employer, making it more difficult to restore 
the plan to a satisfactory position by suspending the accrual of benefits. 
6.2 Stationary Active Member Population 
Assume that, as in previous simulations, our plan has a stationary 
population of active members and that Eo is based on a net interest 
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x, 0) = x - 25; and a(t) and 
b t are determined as in equations (16) and (17). 
We simulate the progress of the plan for the following investment 
scenarios: 
l. jt "" et - 0.04; and 
2. jt = et - 0.10. 
Scenario (1) implies an average return net of wage inflation of 0 percent 
per annum, whereas scenario (2) implies an average net return of -6 
percent per annum. Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations. 
Part (a) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the assets of the 
plan reach a low point after the stock market crash of 1974-1975. In 
scenario 2 the assets fall close to zero in 1975, but the plan recovers in 
the following years. 
Part (b) of Figure 5 shows that the benefit outgo falls in both scenar-
ios. In scenario 2 the poor investment experience results in the contin-
uous suspension of accrual from 1951 to 1985; thus, the benefit outgo 
falls more steeply compared with scenario l. An important threshold is 
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attained when the benefit outgo falls below 40 units, the annual contri-
bution income from the employer. At this point the plan is assured of 
having sufficient cash flow to pay future benefits. Thus, provided that 
the plan has survived to this threshold, there is no longer an immediate 
risk of ruin. Significantly, in scenario 2 the benefit outgo falls below 40 
units shortly before the stock market crash of 1974-1975. 
Part (c) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the solvency ratio 
falls to a low point after the 1974-1975 crash and recovers strongly 
over the following decade. In scenario 2 there is a brief period in the 
early 1980s when the solvency ratio explodes: reaching a maximum 
value of 910 percent at the start of 1985. This occurs because the 
accrued liabilities of the plan have fallen to a low figure as a result of 
the suspension of accrual of benefits for over 30 years. The solvency 
ratio of 910 percent is accompanied by a funding ratio of only 127 
percent, illustrating the suitability of the entry age normal method for 
plans with small accrued liabilities. 
These simulations show that the risk of ruin from poor investment 
experience is not much of a problem, provided that the number of ac-
tive members (and therefore the contribution income) does not decline. 
Even if investment returns average 6 percent per annum below wage in-
flation (a pessimistic scenario) and returns are as variable as those over 
the past 45 years (including the unusually severe crash of 1974-1975) 
our plan would have avoided ruin. 
Ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations obtained using 
the stochastic model for equity returns described above. One hundred 
simulations are made for various different combinations of the mean of 
the log-normal distribution for rt and the initial solvency ratio. For the 
plan to avoid ruin, we require that F (t) > 0 for all t > O. The number 
of occasions on which the plan fails to avoid ruin over each run of 100 
simulations is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Ruin Frequency 
Stationary Active Member Population 
Average Return on'Fund (A VRF) 
SR(O) 0% -1% -2% -3% -4% -5% -6% -7% -8% 
1.00 0 0 1 1 1 1 17 42 71 
0.75 0 0 2 2 3 14 31 59 73 
0.50 1 7 28 41 56 83 89 99 100 
296 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.2, 1995 
As before, ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations ob-
tained using the stochastic model for equity returns described earlier, 
each run consisting of 100 simulations. The results are displayed in 
Table 7. 
Table 7 
Ruin Frequency 
Declining Active Member Population 
Average Return on Fund 
SR(O) 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 
1.50 73 34 20 5 0 
1.00 90 72 45 21 6 
0.50 98 89 67 44 30 
The frequencies obtained again appear broadly consistent with the 
results of the deterministic simulations. Even when the initial solvency 
ratio is 100 percent and the average net investment return is 3 percent 
per annum (in line with the actuary's assumption), the estimated prob-
ability of ruin is as high as 0.21. Furthermore, a high initial solvency 
ratio of 150 percent does not seem to offer much additional protec-
tion; the estimated probability of ruin is still as high as 0.20 when the 
average investment return is only 1 percent below that assumed by the 
actuary. 
6.4 Avoiding Ruin 
When we have a stationary population of active members, invest-
ment returns have to be poor for our plan to run out of money. Unless 
the average return falls below the actuary's assumption by around 9 
percent per annum, the suspension of accrual appears to be a strong 
enough remedy to restore the plan to solvency. Once the benefit outgo 
of the plan falls below the contribution income, the possibility of ruin 
disappears. 
The main problem with the above approach is dissatisfaction among 
active members if it appears that the accrual of benefits has been sus-
pended for an indefinite period. It is essential that our proposed plan 
requires no member contributions, in order to reduce the likelihood 
that a large proportion of the active members would leave the plan if 
beaefit accrual were suspended. 
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Another option would be to seek the consent of the members for 
their accrued benefits to be scaled back in proportion to the solvency 
deficit and for accrual to continue at a somewhat lower rate than before. 
In such a situation there would be a clear conflict of interest between 
members with different amounts of past service; those with long past 
service would have most to lose from the accrued benefits being uni-
formly scaled back, whereas younger members potentially would have 
most to gain by the restoration of benefit accrual. The actuary would 
play an important role here in suggesting a suitable compromise; the 
solvency deficit could be eliminated partly by a cut in the accrued ben-
efits and partly by fixing the rate of benefit accrual at a low level for a 
temporary period. 
When the active member population of the plan is declining, the risk 
of ruin is more serious. In this situation the contribution income of the 
plan is falling in relation to the accrued liabilities, so the suspension of 
accrual is less effective in restoring the plan to solvency. 
Allowing the plan to run out of money is unacceptable, as the re-
maining active members would be left with no benefits at all at the 
expense of those who had been lucky enough to retire (or take transfer 
values) earlier. The plan would have to be wound-up, or converted to 
a pure money purchase arrangement, before the risk of ruin became 
too great. Ideally, this would be done when the solvency ratio was still 
above 100 percent. 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the feasibility of running 
a defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale that could be 
varied to accommodate unpredictable and volatile investment returns. 
The progress of a simple model plan, paying a benefit linked to ca-
reer average revalued salary, has been simulated. These simulations 
include both deterministic projections based on U.K. investment and 
earnings data taken from 1950 to 1994 and projections obtained using 
a stochastic model for equity returns. It has been shown that: 
• In order to maintain a fixed defined benefit scale over the period 
the actuary would have had to predict the average investment re-
turn net of wage inflation to an unrealistic degree of accuracy; 
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• A plan in which the benefit scale is varied when the size of the 
fund falls outside a central corridor can accommodate differences 
between actual and assumed investment returns and can maintain 
reasonable funding and solvency ratios for returns as variable as 
those experienced over the period; 
• The benefit payout of this variable defined benefit plan is more 
stable over time than that of a money purchase plan subject to 
the same volatile investment returns; 
• The uncertainty in the projected benefit payout of the variable 
defined benefit plan is less than in a money purchase plan and 
reduces more quickly as a member approaches retirement; 
• Provided that the number of acth'e members is not declining, the 
risk of ruin due to poor investment experience is small for the 
variable defined benefit plan; and 
• If the number of active members is declining, the risk of ruin 
becomes increasingly significant for the variable defined benefit 
plan, and the plan would need to be wound-up or converted to a 
money purchase arrangement. 
7.2 Comments on Plan Design 
Although the proposed integrated plan pays a benefit linked to ca-
reer average revalued salary, the same results would have been obtained 
for a final salary plan because we assume that each member's salary is 
fixed in units linked to general wage inflation. In the real world a ca-
reer average scale would have concrete advantages because the accrued 
liabilities would be less volatile when actual salary increases deviated 
from wage inflation. It is also arguable that a career average scale is 
better for members, as their benefits are affected less by variations in 
pay close to retirement. 
The proposed plan requires no member contributions, which seems 
to be an absolute necessity if the accrual of benefits is to be suspended 
(or severely curtailed) when the solvency ratio falls below a critical 
value. Mason (1993) outlines a simple method for converting a con-
tributory plan to a noncontributory plan at no cost to the employer. 
There are no pensioner liabilities, because we have assumed a lump 
sum benefit is provided at retirement. In practice the lump sum would 
be used to buy an immediate annuity from an insurance company. 
There are two good reasons why the plan should avoid retaining pen-
sioner liabilities, viz.: 
Khorasanee: Pension Plan 299 
• Retaining such liabilities would reduce the ratio of the contribu-
tion income to the accrued liabilities, making it more difficult to 
eliminate a solvency deficit by suspending the accrual of benefit 
and thus increasing the risk of ruin; and 
• Pensioners would seek representation on a trustee board, and 
their interests might conflict with those of the active members. 
The benefit on withdrawal from service is revalued in line with wage 
inflation. This ensures that the expected benefit at retirement is pro-
portional to the length of pensionable service, irrespective of when the 
member leaves the plan. Final salary plans give a lower benefit to those 
who leave early, because the rate of revaluation of deferred pensions 
is normally below wage inflation. A money purchase plan paying the 
same rate of contribution for all members favors younger entrants be-
cause their funds accumulate over longer periods compared with older 
entrants. It is reasonable to assume that a rational group of employees 
would prefer the equitable approach meted by a career average plan. 
7.3 Rules for Adjusting the Benefits 
The simple rules used for adjusting the benefit payout could be re-
fined to permit greater flexibility. For example, we have assumed that 
the whole of any surplus in excess of a 50 percent funding margin would 
be distributed immediately. Members retiring just before the funding 
ratio went above 150 percent might feel aggrieved. The actuary instead 
could recommend a sliding scale for surplus distributions. Similarly, if 
the solvency position of the plan were threatened, step-by-step reduc-
tions in the rate of accrual may be preferable to the complete suspen-
sion of accrual. Refinements of this kind could reduce the variability 
in the benefit payout of the plan. 
Explicit rules should exist for adjusting the benefit scale, rather 
than allowing a purely discretionary approach (as in a with-profit fund). 
Members are unlikely to enjoy having their benefits being determined 
by what they may perceive as the ,,,,him of the plan actuary. If the actu-
ary felt that any change in the rules were required, this could be put to 
the trustees. 
7.4 Role of the Plan Actuary 
There is little doubt that the plan actuary would have a vital role, 
possibly a more important role than in a traditional defined benefit 
plan. The members would depend on the advice of the actuary to: 
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• Agree on a suitable target benefit for their plan; 
• Decide on equitable methods for distributing surplus while re-
taining an adequate margin against possible unfavorable future 
experience; 
• Decide on equitable methods for keeping the plan solvent should 
investment returns be poorer than expected; 
• Take appropriate action if the risk of ruin had become unaccept-
able as a result of a decline in the number of active members. 
References 
Bodie, N. "Retirement Provision Issues for Employers and Employees." 
Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial Society (March 18, 1989). 
Carr, D. "Determination of the Contribution Rate to Money Purchase 
Arrangements." Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial Society (March IS, 
1988). 
Davies, B. "Pension Scheme Surpluses." Journal of Staple Inn Actuarial 
Society (October 22, 1991). 
Government Statistical Service. The Abstract of Statistics for Social Se-
curity Benefits and Contributions and the Indices of Retail Prices and 
Average Earnings. London: Government Statistical Service, 1993. 
Mason, J,J, "Design of Company Pension Arrangements." Journal of Sta-
ple Inn Actuarial Society (March 30, 1993). 
Pension Law Review Committee. Pension Law Reform. Bristol, United 
Kingdom: Department of Social Security, 1993. 
Wilkie, A.D. "Some Applications of Stochastic Investment Models." Jour-
nal of Staple Inn Actuarial Society, 29 (1986): 25-51. 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 3, No.2, 1995 
Expected Loss Development in Workers' 
Compensation Pricing: A Shift in Credibility 
Christopher J. Poteet* 
Abstractt 
This paper shows that expected loss development is equivalent to adjusting 
the full credibility standard and applying credibility by policy period. Expected 
loss development should not be used in workers' compensation ratemaking. 
The credibility is correct before being adjusted. 
Key words and phrases: formula pure premium, ultimate loss development 
1 Introduction 
Concerns with the current loss development method used in work-
ers' compensation class rate making have been raised by Lamb (1993). If 
a class has zero losses at a first report, using a first to ultimate loss de-
velopment factor produces zero ultimate losses as well. One possible 
solution is to use expected loss development. To simplify the illus-
tration, assume that all losses are at the same benefit level, etc. The 
other factors easily can be taken into account later. Also for Simplicity 
assume that there is only one policy period used and national pure pre-
miums are not used. The following arguments then will be extended to 
include more policy periods and the use of national pure premiums. 
* Christopher]. Poteet is an actuarial associate at the National Council on Compen-
sation Insurance, Inc. He received a B.S. and an M.Ed. in mathematics from the Penn-
sylvania State University. 
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tThis paper is based on the author's earlier paper entitled: "Expected Loss Develop-
ment: A Shift in Credibility" that appeared in the Casualty Actuarial Society Forum, Fall 
1995. The author thanks the anonymous referees and the editor for their comments 
and suggestions that led to the development of the current paper. 
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Workers' compensation classification ratemaking relies on several 
estimates of class pure premiums. One estimate is based on the lat-
est available data for the class and state. This is called the indicated 
pure premium. Another estimate is the pure premium underlying cur-
rent rates brought to the level of the indicated pure premiums. This 
estimate is called the present on rate level pure premium. A third esti-
mate is a national pure premium which includes data from other states 
adjusted to reflect conditions in the reviewed state. These estimates 
are combined using credibility weightsl to produce the formula pure 
premium. The formula pure premium is defined as follows: 
J:' I Pu P . _ Formula Pure Premium Losses (1) 
rormu a re remlUm - Payroll/IOO . 
The objective of this paper is to show that using expected loss de-
velopment will yield the same formula pure premium as obtained by 
adjusting the credibilities. 
2 Determining Formula Pure Premium 
2.1 One Year Losses 
In order to determine the formula pure premium, we must deter-
mine the losses. Using expected loss development, initially the ex-
pected loss E (the present on-rate level pure premium multiplied by 
the payroll in hundreds) is the estimate of ultimate losses that is used 
to calculate the indicated pure premium. At a first report the actual 
losses A that have emerged can replace the losses that were expected 
to have emerged, namely (l/D) x E, where D is the first to ultimate 
loss development factor. If the development factor is less that one, the 
estimate of ultimate losses using expected loss development may be 
negative. Ultimate losses, however, cannot actually be negative. This 
points out a weakness in the expected loss development methodology. 
Credibility weighting produces the losses used in the formula pure 
premium. Let L denote the losses and Z and (1 - Z) denote the credi-
bility weights used in the formula pure premium. It follows that: 
Expected Loss Development: 
L = Z (A + (1 - ~)E) + (1 - Z)E 
1 Credibility weights are the relative credence (trustworthiness) assigned to each es-
timate. These weights are non-negative and sum to one. 
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Z Z (D)XAxD+(I- D)XE. (2) 
Current Method: 
L = Z x A x D + (1 - Z) x E. (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) are equivalent where Z I D in equation (2) is sub-
stituted for Z in equation (3). (Note that Z does not change.) Using 
Z I D instead of Z is equivalent to changing the full credibility standard 
that already limits fluctuations of formula pure premiums to a deSired 
amount. The expected loss development method relies less on actual 
losses and more on expected losses than the current method. The ex-
pected loss development method implicitly lowers credibility by liD, 
when D > 1. Expected loss development is a shift in credibility, giving 
less weight to actual losses and more weight to expected losses. 
The equation that shows that expected loss development is equiv-
alent to changing the full credibility standard can be expanded to in-
clude more policy periods and national pure premiums. The relation-
ship holds if the credibility of indicated data is calculated by policy 
period and the national credibility is allowed to remain unchanged as 
one switches from one method to the other. 
2.2 A General Formula 
It can easily be proved that the serious (or nonserious or medical) 
formula pure premium calculated using expected loss development is 
equal to the serious (or nonserious or medical) formula pure premium 
calculated using credibility by policy period, where the credibility one 
normally would use is divided by the policy period's development to 
ultimate factor and multiplied by a factor reflecting the contribution 
of the policy period's exposure to the total. These individual credibil-
ities are used as weights for the indicated pure premiums calculated 
separately for each individual policy period. Let 
m Number of reports of losses; 
Ai Actual i-th report of losses, i = 1, ... , m; 
Di i-th to ultimate loss development factor, i = I, ... , m; 
Ei Ultimate expected losses for i-th report, i = 1, ... , m; 
Pi i-th report payroll in hundreds, i = 1, ... , m; 
m 
P IPi; 
i=l 
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State-indicated credibility weight; 
National credibility weight; 
p(n) National pure premium; 
pte) Present on rate level pure premium; and 
p(f) Formula pure premium. 
In practice, we define Ei as follows: 
Ei = pte) X Pi for i = 1, ... , m. (4) 
For the expected loss development method, p(f) is defined to be 
p(f) = i i~ (Ai + (1 - ~j )Ei) + ZnP(n) + (1 - Z - Zn)p(e). (5) 
After some elementary algebra and rearranging terms, we have 
p(f) = f (ZPi )(AiDi) + ZnP(n) + (1 - Zn - f (ZPi») p(e). (6) 
i=l DiP Pi i=l DiP 
On the other hand, for the current method, 
m 
p(f) = ~ Z (Atf!i) + ZnP(n) + (1 - Zn - Z)p(e). (7) 
t=l 
3 An Example 
The following example is a specific illustration of the equivalence 
relationship. The example uses the data from Lamb (1993, Exhibit 1) 
and the development factors listed on page 321 of Lamb's paper. The 
state credibilities in the paper are calculated using a square root rule 
instead of NCCI's old two thirds rule-the serious state credibility of 
0.67 is equal to 0.59 to the three fourths power [0.67 = (0.593/2)1/2]. 
Suppose we are given the follmving information m = 3, Z = 0.67, Zn = 0.16, p(n) = 1.287, and pte) = 1.203 and the data in Table 1. Using 
equations (4) and (5) yields the formula pure premium p(f) = 1.221. 
Alternatively, we can use Table 2 and equation (6) to derive the same 
result, Le., p(f) = 1.221. 
Our example focuses on the calculation of the serious formula pure 
premium. More recent years have higher development factors, so credi-
bility is lowered more for them. Each year's credibility also is multiplied 
by a weight equal to the year's proportion of exposure to the total of 
all years. More recent years would tend to have higher exposures due 
to wage inflation, all else constant. 
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i 
1 
2 
3 
4 Conclusions 
Table 1 
Data 
AiDi Di Pi 
1,731,862 3.773 435,476.49 
145,463 1.993 497,284.62 
393,906 1.417 426,167.48 
Table 2 
The Alternative Approach 
i (ZPi)J (DiP) AiDi/ Pi 
1 0.057 3.977 
2 
3 
0.123 
0.148 
0.293 
0.924 
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Expected loss development can be thought of as a shift in credibility 
from the indicated pure premiums to the present on-rate-level pure pre-
mium. (See Table 3.) Expected loss development relies heavily on the 
present on-rate-level pure premium, whereas the new NCCI full credi-
bility standard and partial credibility formula give equal weight to the 
present on-rate-level pure premium and the national pure premium. 
NCCI now uses higher full credibility standards and a 0.4 power 
partial credibility formula to recognize the need for stability. The cred-
ibility given to the indicated data using the new NCCI standard and 
formula is about the same as the credibility for expected loss devel-
opment, therefore limiting fluctuations by about the same amount as 
expected loss development. An advantage to the expected loss devel-
opment scheme is the consideration of different credibilities by policy 
period. 
Expected loss development should not be used in workers' compen-
sation class rate making. Expected loss development is equivalent to 
adjusting credibility. An extensive study was performed by NCCI to 
develop new full credibility standards and a partial credibility formula 
that provides a desirable balance between stability and responsiveness. 
Adjusting these credibilities dovmward would restrict the fluctuations 
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Table 3 
Credibilities 
Serious Pure Premium Indicated 
Current Loss Development 0.67 
Expected Loss Development 0.33 
New NCCI Standard & Formula 0.38 
Notes: PORL = Present on Rate Level 
National PORL 
0.16 0.17 
0.16 0.51 
0.31 0.31 
in formula pure premiums and make rate changes less responsive. This 
is especially undesirable in states that have undergone major workers' 
compensation benefit reforms in recent years. One might argue that 
more recent years should receive less credibility than older years be-
cause more recent data are less mature. On the other hand, respon-
siveness to a changing workers' compensation environment would be 
sacrificed. 
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